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Preface
What This Book Is, and What It Isn’t
This book is part of an answer to a question I asked when I was rede-
signing a course I often teach: how might a class, taken as a unit of 
which a book is merely part, serve as a vehicle for ideas? I was think-
ing about how different types of writing express ideas differently. 
A song, a novel, and a comic book can all recount the same events, 
but they won’t tell the same story. Likewise, a monograph, an arti-
cle, and a conference paper can all report the same results, but they 
won’t convey the same ideas. So how might a class—with its books, 
its syllabus, its assignments, its regularly scheduled meetings, its 
questions and answers—become a collective, collaborative text? Who 
could read it? What would they learn?1
I wrote this book with these questions in mind. It’s a trace left by 
the course, so to speak—an echo that gives some sense of what my 
conversation with my students sounded like. As a result, the chapters 
that follow might sound like lectures or, if I’m doing things right, 
turns taken in that conversation. That’s by design, in that I use this 
book to demonstrate the ideas I describe. In the introduction, for 
instance, I give an example of two people trying to come to a shared 
1 I’ve long admired the students of Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist whose 
Cours de linguistique générale (1916; published in English in 1959 as Course in General 
Linguistics) laid the foundation for structuralism. He didn’t write the book himself. 
His students did, based on their notes from the course. His clarity and their dedica-
tion showed what a course, taken as a unit, might be.
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understanding of an object through a series of back-and-forth ques-
tions. I engage in similar exchanges throughout this book. The things 
I want to understand better are communication theory and cultural 
translation, and those are the things we talk about in class.
Consequently, my first audience has been the students in the 
course I was redesigning—a third-year undergraduate course on 
communication theory at the University of Ottawa. They have been 
worthy partners in conversation. They are smart people, capable of 
careful and rigorous thought, if they’re so inclined. They’re willing to 
work, although like anyone else, they object to work that serves no 
clear purpose. The most meaningful difference between them and me 
is that I’ve had twenty more years to spend reading: when I make ref-
erences they do not catch, it is not because I’m smarter but because 
I’m older. These things—my students’ intelligence and work ethic on 
the one hand, and the disparity in our respective levels of experience 
on the other—explain two choices I’ve made in the pages that follow. 
First, I’ve explained every reference I think even ten students (out 
of a class of a hundred) might not catch. I’ve also glossed technical 
terms they might not have encountered before. Second, I’ve used pic-
tures wherever they are useful for cutting through the abstractions 
to which I’m prone, and to which the subject matter lends itself, 
especially in cases of metacognition and metatheory (thinking about 
thinking and theory about theory). I want this book to demonstrate 
that clarity and rigour go hand in hand, a lesson for which I have my 
students to thank.
So is this book a textbook? Not in a conventional sense. Typical 
theory textbooks are secondary sources in that they present con-
cepts others have developed, along with explanations of context 
and explications of ideas. Perhaps the best in this genre is Theoriz-
ing Communication: Readings Across Traditions, by Robert Craig and 
Heidi Muller, who organize communication theory into seven such 
traditions. They reproduce original articles and book chapters to give 
students more or less direct access to the original expression of each 
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tradition’s ideas. But their contribution—what makes their book a 
textbook—is the work they have done to organize, summarize, and 
contextualize the readings. In other words, it’s a secondary source.
This book approaches theory differently. When I teach, I want 
to do more than give students a set of ideas to memorize.2 I want 
to engage them in the process of doing theory—of approaching a 
question the way a scholar would approach it. In my experience, that 
means responding to, arguing with, and refining ideas other scholars 
have proposed. The end result is a new set of ideas. The point of this 
book is to walk students through these steps—to teach by doing. 
My model has been the books published for the Open University in 
England in the 1990s, such as Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the 
Sony Walkman and Representation: Cultural Representations and Signi-
fying Practices.3 Although they were intended as textbooks, adopting 
a familiar tone and focusing on the building blocks of theory, they 
are also about the praxis of teaching. They are shaped by a productive 
tension between pedagogy and originality: because they demonstrate 
how to think like a scholar and how to produce new ideas, they must 
be original themselves. In the same way, the exercise I undertake here 
is meaningful only if I’ve written a book other scholars will engage 
with as a primary source, which is to say, a book that offers a novel 
take on long-standing questions. 
Thus my second audience has been other scholars (but just as 
this book is not a conventional textbook, it’s not a conventional 
monograph, either). I address two groups explicitly: those in com-
munication and cultural studies and those in translation studies, 
as I write in the introductory chapter. They will already have read 
the theorists with whose ideas I engage. They will also recognize the 
2 The same is true of Craig and Muller, I’m sure, but whenever I use their textbook, 
that seems to be what my students expect to do—despite my efforts to the con-
trary—as soon as they see a list of traditions and their respective readings.
3 Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall, Linda Janes, Hugh Mackay, and Keith Negus, Doing 
Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman; and Stuart Hall, ed., Representation: 
Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices.
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
xiv Preface
debates into which I enter, even when I don’t name them explicitly. 
I hope they will take this book on the merits of the arguments it 
presents, although I also hope they will recognize the way my peda-
gogical goals shape the presentation of my ideas. If I were writing 
only for them, I would pursue the implications of certain assertions 
further, whereas here, I see value in showing students the way argu-
ments work without plunging in to the morass of details that come 
about when people trained to split hairs go about the business of, 
well, splitting hairs. For people learning the skills of doing theory, it’s 
enough to read Stuart Hall’s “Encoding/Decoding” (as I do in chapter 
1) without also having read David Morley’s application of the essay
in the 1980s, as well as recent revisions of Morley’s application of
Hall’s ideas, and so on.4 My students are smart—they are more than
capable of doing theory—but they don’t yet have the background to
sort through those details. In fact, the point of this book is to give
them the skills to acquire that background.
I am responding to a third group, too, namely philosophers of edu-
cation whose books have influenced the way I think about teaching. 
I do not address them explicitly. Instead, this book (and the class of 
which it is part) is itself my response to their work. In particular, I 
am guided by the idea that
it is time to put what is good in the world—that which is under 
threat and which we wish to preserve—at the centre of our 
attention and to make a conceptual space in which we can take 
up our responsibility . . . in the face of, and in spite of, oppression 
and silent melancholy.5
4 David Morley, The “Nationwide” Audience: Structure and Decoding; and Sujeong 
Kim, “Rereading David Morley’s The ‘Nationwide’ Audience.” I’ve adapted this example 
from Jonathan Culler’s Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction.
5 Naomi Hodgson, Joris Vlieghe, and Piotr Zamojski, Manifesto for a Post-Critical 
Pedagogy, 19. Other books to which I am responding are Samuel Rocha’s Folk 
Phenomenology: Education, Study, and the Human Person and A Primer for Philosophy 
and Education and, in a very different vein, William Caraher, Kostis Kourelis, and 
Andrew Reinhard’s Punk Archaeology.
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I like these philosophers because they issue a call to action. (“The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways,” wrote 
Marx in 1845; “the point is to change it.”)6 I’m responding by heeding 
their call and trying to put their ideas (and mine) into practice. They 
insist—and I agree—that teaching matters. It matters because think-
ing matters, and thinking matters because the world is a mysterious 
place worth exploring and fighting for.
So what is this book? Neither conventional textbook nor conven-
tional monograph, it is a book for thinking with. To complement it 
(and complete the class-as-text of which it’s part), I’ve included a 
version of my syllabus in the appendix. This book is meaningful only 
if people take their turn in the conversation.
With that, let’s jump in.





Thank you to my partners in the conversations that became the soil 
out of which this book grew. Of these, most important have been 
my students. At the University of North Dakota, where I started 
my career, I began developing these ideas in Comm 405: Social 
Implications of an Information Society, and Comm 501: Theoretical 
Perspectives in Communication. At the University of Ottawa, where 
I have taught for the past five years, I developed them in CMN 
3109: Advanced Theories of Communication, CMN 5132: Theories 
and Effects of the Media, and CMN 8111: Theories in Media Studies. 
I am especially indebted to the students in CMN 3109 during the 
Winter and Spring/Summer 2018 terms and in CMN 5132 and CMN 
8111 during the Fall 2018 term, who read and engaged with drafts 
of different chapters. I am also grateful to the doctoral students at 
the Universität Trier for their perceptive engagement when I deliv-
ered talks based on chapters 2 and 3 as part of the university’s IRTG: 
Diversity program in July 2019.
Going back further, I want to thank my teachers who prized 
rigour, clarity, and, above all, θαυμάζειν, or thaumazein, the sense 
of astonishment (according to Aristotle) out of which philosophy 
springs. They include my grade 5 teacher, Mrs. Sprague, Timberwilde 
Elementary; Mrs. Lorenzetti, my English teacher in grade 8 at Baker 
Junior High School; Mr. Kornegay, who taught me calculus in grade 
11 at Albuquerque High School; and Ms. Parris, my grade 12 English 
teacher at Albuquerque High School. They also include two of my 
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professors at the University of North Dakota, Kathleen Dixon and 
Michael Beard, both in the Department of English. Others have been 
teachers in practice, if not in title, including Brent Christianson, in 
Madison, Wisconsin, and Erin Burns, in Ottawa. And some are simply 
my friends, in particular Sam Rocha.
In a narrower sense, I owe a professional debt to Elizabeth Galew-
ski, Joshua Young, and Brett Ommen. If I know anything about 
rhetorical invention, it is because of them. (But if I can’t get my facts 
straight, that’s on me.) Liz, with whom I had coffee once a week 
when we were students at the University of Wisconsin, taught me 
about tropological invention and the pleasures of irony. Josh, whose 
doctoral work I had the privilege of supervising in its final stages, 
taught me to look for invention in unexpected places. And Brett—he 
was my colleague and friend at the University of North Dakota. We 
have since gone our separate ways, but one thing (among many) he 
showed me was that we can pick and choose what we need from the 
tools of theory to solve the problem at hand. His approach to theory 
was endlessly inventive.
In a more immediate sense, I want to thank Enrique Uribe- 
Jongbloed, now at the Universidad Externado de Colombia, and 
Craig Walker, at Queen’s University. In 2016, Enrique invited me to 
give the keynote address at a conference on cultural transduction 
(his term for cultural translation, more or less). That talk became 
chapter 1 of this book. But the other chapters came from the page 
of notes I jotted down while listening to Craig’s presentation on 
Petr Pavlenskii. He is no doubt unaware of the way his talk struck 
me, not only for what he was saying but for what he was doing: he 
made me walk around a concept I thought I knew well (cultural 
translation) and see it from a new angle.
I also want to thank everyone at Athabasca University Press, 
especially Pamela Holway. This is an odd book—no two ways around 
it!—and she was its strongest supporter from the moment I con-
tacted her. I had given myself over to writing it, asking only one 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
Acknowledgements xix
thing of each sentence and each idea: must this be said, and must it 
be said this way? It’s risky to draw stick figures in an academic book, 
but Pamela embraced not just the arguments and ideas but also the 
spirit of the act that created them. I also want to thank the press’s 
director Megan Hall for her enthusiasm, and editor Peter Midgley 
for his generous and sensitive revisions.
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People’s Minds Are Hard to Change
People’s minds are hard to change. When we encounter a new idea, we 
compare it to things in the world we already know, and that world—
the one we navigate through every day—already makes sense. It is 
fully formed, and even if an outside viewer might say it’s faulty, it 
seems complete to us. There are no loose ends, and new ideas clash 
with its completeness. To make sense of them, we ask whether they 
fit in the world we know, but because they’re new, they might not. 
The problem isn’t the new idea—it’s the persuasiveness of the world 
we have come to know and take for granted.1
This book is about how to change people’s minds. It takes as its 
starting point two related observations. First, in our modern world, 
we are faced with tremendous challenges—intense social and political 
polarization, the looming threat of terror, and the reality of systemic 
discrimination, to name only a few. Second, these challenges have at 
1 Many of my students—my first audience in this book—will probably experience 
this challenge as they read this book. What I want to do is introduce ideas that cur-
rently have no place in their symbolic universe. They might not make sense, at least 
not right now, but I hope that by drawing attention to the challenge itself, I might 
help my students take a critical step back to see their presuppositions in a new light. 
This is not an easy task.
For the background literature on this phenomenon, see Janice A. Dole and Gale M. 
Sinatra, “Reconceptualizing Change in Cognitive Construction of Knowledge”; and 




least one thing in common: however wide the range of factors that 
have brought them about, they are all supported by some people’s 
interpretations of the world, interpretations that cause them to act 
in ways that perpetuate the challenges we face. At the same time, 
not everyone sees the world the same way. People’s minds can be 
changed. We must ask how the factors that shape these challenges 
come to have meaning, and then recognize that ultimately meaning 
is not static. It can be contested. Our goal is to engage in that process 
of contesting meaning, and this book is one way to achieve it. It is 
about shifting people’s perspectives—our perspectives—so that the 
world we already know appears a bit off. That is, it is about shaking 
up the world we know so we can see what an outside viewer can see 
but we cannot. The tool to make this possible is cultural translation. 
What is cultural translation? It is a term that means a lot of 
things to a lot of people.2 To anthropologists, it is a way to explain 
a foreign culture to their readers. In the 1950s, for instance, British 
social anthropologists viewed the “problem of describing to others 
how members of a remote tribe think largely as one of translation, 
of making the coherence primitive thought has in the languages it 
really lives in, as clear as possible in our own.”3 By the 1980s, anthro-
pologists had grown more reflexive, as books such as Writing Culture 
showed.4 They began to address the Eurocentric biases in such obser-
vations, leading critics such as Edward Said to write that the “native 
point of view . . . is not an ethnographic fact only, is not a hermen-
eutical construct primarily or even principally; it is in large measure 
a continuing, protracted, and sustained adversarial resistance to the 
discipline and the praxis of anthropology.”5
2 For overviews, see Sarah Maitland, What Is Cultural Translation? and Kyle Conway, 
“A Conceptual and Empirical Approach to Cultural Translation,” and “Cultural 
Translation.”
3 Godfrey Lienhardt, “Modes of Thought,” 97.
4 James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics 
of Ethnography.
5 Edward Said, “Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors,” 219–20.
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Such critiques contributed to a different sense of the term, one 
more current in postcolonial studies, where it has come to describe 
a way to draw the logic of colonialism into question. Homi Bhabha, 
for instance, sees potential in the ways that immigrants introduce 
something new or foreign into the realm of the familiar as they live 
their “culture of the ‘in-between’, the minority position, [which] 
dramatizes the activity of culture’s untranslatability.”6 In this way, 
for people like Bhabha, cultural translation holds the potential of 
challenging fixed notions of identity, especially in multicultural soci-
eties in Europe and North America.
To me, cultural translation means something more specific, 
and the definition I employ offers one possible synthesis of earlier 
notions by showing how taking others on their own terms can lead 
people to see their own identity in a new way. Cultural translation, 
as I describe it in this book, is a way to come to understand an object 
or text whose meaning derives from a shared interpretation of the 
world. It takes place through conversation and exchange. 
Consider an illustration. Two people meet, and the first is inter-
ested in an object the second carries (figure 1). “What is that?” asks 
the first. “It’s an X,” says the second. “We use it when we do Y.” “Neat,” 
says the first, “that sounds like when we do Z.” “Not exactly,” answers 
the second, “it’s more like this.” Through such an exchange, the first 
person, substituting familiar references for the object in question, 
comes to understand (at least in an approximate way) how the second 
makes sense of it. In other words, cultural translation is a form of 
a give-and-take over meaning, or as I describe it elsewhere, in ways 
more in line with my scholarly argot, a semiotic economy where signs 
are exchanged for other signs on a basis negotiation rather than 
equivalence.7 What makes it translation is the way we substitute one 
sign for another. What makes it cultural is the way the objects whose 
6 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 224.
7 See Kyle Conway, “Cultural Translation, Global Television Studies, and the Circu-
lation of Telenovelas in the United States.”
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meaning we are trying to discover are shared among members of 
different communities (although boundaries between communities 
might not be clearly marked). The type of cultural translation I am 
most interested in has clear ethical implications. It must, as Sarah 
Maitland insists, “have as its primary objective nothing short of the 
transformation of human hearts and minds.”8
Figure 1. Cultural translation. Drawn by the author.
How do we reach this high bar? I propose that we engage in acts 
of wilful and strategic misreading. As I describe in the following sec-
tions, I’m writing to teachers and students. Our task is to return to 
the work of thinking, to reclaim our engagement with ideas. This 
task is complicated (and enriched) by the double status of cultural 
translation in this book: it is our primary object of study, but it also 
provides a mode of inquiry. That is, we can ask about the tools people 
use to arrive at a shared understanding of an object, and we can use 
those tools to understand the object of cultural translation itself. 
This reflexivity in turn opens up the question of what it means to 
8 Maitland, What Is Cultural Translation? 53.
Hey, cool! What’s that?
It’s an X. We use it when we do Y.
Neat! That sounds like when we do Z.
Not exactly, it’s more like...
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communicate. There is no more fundamental theoretical question 
than this, and in this respect, this book has a second area of focus, 
namely communication theory.
In the next sections, I talk about my audiences, and I untangle the 
relationship between the fields of translation studies and communi-
cation. Then I describe how teaching and research are two sides of 
the same coin and how they impose their own strategies to cultivate 
and refine the skills of purposeful reading. These strategies lead me 
finally to the idea of the parallax view, or the shift in perspective 
that makes wilful misreading possible. It is the parallax view that, 
ultimately, makes it possible to appreciate the art of communication 
in a polarized world.
Who Are We? What Is Our Role?
I want to be clear about something. When I say “we,” it’s not an 
abstraction. I mean real people leading real lives. What we’re doing is 
theory, and we’re doing it with the practical goal of changing people’s 
minds by helping them shift perspective so that different facets of 
the world they know appear. In that respect, this is not a conven-
tional book. It’s an experiment. We will play—I will play—with tone 
and registers, and there will be lots of pictures. I argue (in chapter 
1) that communication is always translation because we are always
substituting one sign for another, and I want to substitute (among
other things) pictures for words. I also argue that communication
is rooted in the contingent moment. I am not an objective reporter.
You (yes, you) are not a neutral observer. My first draft of this book
was not a book at all. It was a series of lectures, complete with slides, 
that I delivered as part of a class (and will probably deliver again next 
semester). This is why, in this book, we are inextricably imbricated
in indexicals, words that point to people or places or moments in
time—“you,” “I,” “there,” “here,” “then,” “now.” Our relationship is
real, even if temporally complicated. (My right now is not your right
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
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now. I am imagining you, future reader, imagining me, where my 
present is your past.) This guide is tactical only as long as we remem-
ber that relationship.
In other words, this book has a second purpose in addition to 
exploring cultural translation. It is a teaching tool, and it is addressed 
to a very specific audience: professors and students (specifically in 
cultural studies and translation studies). I am a professor. I have been 
teaching for a decade and a half. Right now I teach at the University 
of Ottawa. I was also once a student. I earned a bachelor’s degree 
at the University of North Dakota (where, much later, I was also a 
professor), a master’s at York University in Toronto, and a PhD at 
the University of Wisconsin. Why do I include these personal details? 
Because I am not talking to students or professors in an abstract 
sense. I am talking to my colleagues and friends, and I am talking to 
my students. I am concerned that, under pressure from politicians 
and corporations to turn university education into workforce train-
ing, we run the very real risk of abdicating our responsibility to train 
people to think or to do the work of thinking ourselves. Thus when I 
talk of students and professors, I don’t want to make airy pronounce-
ments about the university and society. I want to call for a return to 
the hard work of thinking. (If you’re my student, remember—I am 
talking to you.) That’s who we are. That’s our role.
What is this work? Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno give us 
some sense of it in “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception” when they talk about competing notions of artistic style. 
In a broad sense, they argue that the culture industry tells us what to 
think and how to feel. (By culture industry they mean the capitalists 
who sell us entertainment and shape how we understand the world.) 
Of course, we don’t like to be told these things, and we flatter our-
selves to believe that even if others can be duped, we cannot. But the 
culture industry is pernicious: it tricks us into thinking it’s our idea 
to feel the way it wants us to feel. We trade real thinking for ersatz 
thinking. In the case of style, we trade an older concept for a newer, 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
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flatter one. In the past, style described the form an artist’s statement 
took in the face of the world as its forces overwhelmed and negated 
her or him. It was individual and irreproducible. In contrast, style 
in contemporary culture describes the routinized elements that act 
like an artist’s “brand.” It is rule-bound and predictable. The culture 
industry banks on the fact that we consumers value consistency: we 
want to know what we’re getting before we pay for it. In contrast, 
the work we teachers and students must do—the work I hope to 
encourage with this book—is to return to the type of engagement 
that produced the older form of artistic style.
You could raise objections, of course. If you’re feeling ungenerous, 
you might say that professional academics like me are members of the 
worrying class. Our job is to generate alarm and then offer the very 
classes people should take to overcome their myopia. It’s a cynical 
racket. We diagnose a problem people didn’t even know they had and 
then sell them the tools to solve it.
But we needn’t look to cynical scholars for this type of critique. 
A. O. Scott, film critic for the New York Times, wrote in a review of the 
Adam Sandler movie Funny People, in which Sandler’s face is superim-
posed on a baby’s body, that “there may be no more incisive rendering 
of Hollywood’s self-image, and perhaps no truer, more damning 
mirror held up to the audience” than “that alarming man-baby, with 
the braying voice and the 5 o’clock shadow affixed to a pale, flabby, 
diaper-wrapped trunk.” He goes on to say,
Children are ceaselessly demanding, it’s true; but they are also 
easily satisfied, and this combination of appetite and docility 
makes the child an ideal moviegoer. But since there are a finite 
number of literal children out there, with limited disposable 
income and short attention spans, Hollywood has to make or 
find new ones. And so the studios have, with increasing vigor and 
intensity, carried out a program of mass infantilization.9
9 A. O. Scott, “Open Wide: Spoon-Fed Cinema.”
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It’s a powerful indictment.
There’s a second objection to raise, one that comes from scholars 
themselves. If the field of cultural studies has taught us anything in 
the last three or four decades, it’s that we should beware of these tales 
of gloom and doom. Audiences are active. We’re not dupes. The media 
don’t crack open our heads and dump in their content. Instead, we’re 
active readers of different texts. We bring our experience to what we 
see and hear, and we interpret it through a lens that is partially of 
our own making, partially a function of our class, gender, race, and 
so on. We exercise our agency in constant tension with the world 
around us: even as our choices are constrained by the relations of 
power that link us to other people and groups, we still have choices 
to make. (Notably, this is the argument Stuart Hall makes in his essay 
“Encoding/Decoding,” the subject of chapter 1.)
Still, people are susceptible to the persuasion of advertising, 
which tells us we’ll be happy if only we buy the right deodorant or 
eat the right breakfast cereal. We are susceptible to fake news, or at 
the very least, to politicians who flatter us and tell us just how right 
we are. And, frankly, we don’t like hearing from people who disagree 
with us.10 In other words, our being duped isn’t a given, but neither 
is our resistance. What matters is the way we exercise our agency, 
even when it is constrained. We have the capacity to develop strat-
egies for active resistance, but it must be cultivated. Hence our role 
as professors and students. As Pierre Bourdieu writes, “intellectual 
discourse remains one of the most authentic forms of resistance to 
manipulation and a vital affirmation of the freedom of thought.”11 
Hence this book.
10 See Jeremy A. Frimer, Linda J. Skitka, and Matt Motyl, “Liberals and Conserva-
tives Are Similarly Motivated to Avoid Exposure to One Another’s Opinions.”




I wrote above that I am addressing professors and students in cultural 
studies and translation studies. I hope others read this book, too, but 
if you know my audience, you’ll have a better sense of the context 
for my argument.
So what constitutes these fields?
My formal training is in cultural studies as a subfield of communi-
cation, but my principal object of study has long been translation, 
and I publish often in translation studies journals. I have observed, 
as have others, that there is little exchange between these fields: 
“language and translation have been systematically neglected in the 
current literature on globalization.”12 Or “to a large extent, media, cul-
tural and globalization studies have essentially ignored questions of 
language and translation.”13 Or again, “despite some early opportun-
ities, translation and communication have had little to ‘say’ directly 
to one another.”14
Even when cultural studies and translation scholars do examine 
the same things, they often talk past each other. Translation scholars, 
for instance, have catalogued the many ways translators are influ-
enced by the ideologically charged sociocultural contexts within 
which they work, nuances that many cultural studies scholars fail 
to see. Translation scholars, on the other hand, often overlook the 
complex and contradictory forms of influence that texts have over 
audiences, forms that cultural studies scholars have deftly explored.
For that reason, I hope this book will be an opening point for a 
new line of inquiry, one that puts cultural studies and translation 
scholars into conversation. But it is important not to treat these 
two fields (or their objects of study) as existing a priori. They are 
contested, and they cohere by virtue of the disciplining habits of their 
12 Esperança Bielsa and Susan Bassnett, Translation in Global News, 18.
13 Christof Demont-Heinrich, review of Translation in Global News, 402.
14 Ted Striphas, “Communication as Translation,” 234.
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members. That is, they are relatively closed systems: what makes 
people cultural studies scholars is that they attend cultural studies 
conferences and publish in cultural studies journals. What marks 
those conferences or journals as belonging to cultural studies is that 
cultural studies scholars go or publish there. Likewise for translation 
studies. These venues foster conversations among like-minded schol-
ars who share specific preoccupations that motivate them to examine 
similar objects. Over time, these fields have developed differently in 
response to their respective preoccupations, and they bring different 
lenses to bear on their objects of study.15
Still, there is nothing inherent in either field that would prevent 
scholars from crossing over. Their closure is only relative, not abso-
lute. There are certainly translation scholars such as Susan Bassnett 
whose work is shaped by cultural studies.16 If we use departmental 
affiliation as an index of disciplinary affiliation, we also find a handful 
of cultural studies or communication scholars interested in trans-
lation.17 But they are the exception that proves the rule: the paucity 
of exchange suggests that artificially maintained boundaries remain. 
If this book serves to encourage conversation, it will do so by reveal-
ing the points where each field’s grindstones help sharpen the other 
field’s tools.
15 On this development, see Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms”; Kyle 
Conway, “Cultural Translation: Two Modes”; and Susan Bassnett, “The Translation 
Turn in Cultural Studies.”
16 For example, Bielsa and Bassnett, Translation in Global News.
17 See, for example, Albert Moran, New Flows in Global TV; Ulrike Rohn, “Lacuna 
or Universal? Introducing a New Model for Understanding Cross-cultural Audience 
Demand”; Rainer Guldin, “From Transportation to Transformation: On the Use 
of the Metaphor of Translation Within Media and Communication Theory”; and 
Enrique Uribe-Jongbloed and Hernán David Espinosa-Medina, “A Clearer Picture: 





This book grows out of the years I have spent teaching in these fields. 
I’m an unrepentant theorist. I make my students read texts they 
think are hard. I ask them to read closely and carefully, a practice 
they often find foreign, and I ask them to make claims and stake out 
a position, a practice they often find uncomfortable. In short, I ask 
them to argue with me and with the texts we read.
But that approach presumes they understand the texts in the 
first place, at least enough to have a toe-hold, something to ground 
their interpretations. This skill can be difficult, but it can be learned. 
It’s complex and involves a range of tools, but the tools are simple 
enough. For instance, when I taught a master’s-level survey of theory 
at the University of North Dakota, I gave students three steps to 
follow. As they read each text, I wanted them to look for three things, 
which I put in the syllabus itself:
• What questions does the author seek to answer?
• What arguments does the author make in answer to those
questions?
• What critiques of the author’s arguments can we offer?
On the first day of class, I explained that all the people we read had 
some question in mind they wanted to answer. Sometimes they 
stated their questions explicitly, but not always. If we could identify 
the questions, we could look for the answers they provided in the 
forms of the arguments they made. 
Of the three tasks I gave them, the most difficult, I explained, was 
the third. Critique, in this case, means a wide range of things. Some 
possibilities include:
• Omission: what else might the author have included or
discussed?
• External contradiction: how does the author’s argument
differ from our experience or from what we observe in the
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
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world around us? How does it differ from other theorists’ 
observations?
• Internal contradiction: does the logic of the author’s argument
contradict itself?
I wanted students to look for internal contradictions, but good 
writers hide them well. If students couldn’t find them, external con-
tradictions were valuable, too. In what way, I wanted to know, was 
their experience different from what the author argued? And if that 
was too hard—if they found the authors’ account of their experience 
matched their own—they could always name something the authors 
left out. No one, I said, talks about radio. Or almost no one. So if they 
were stumped for a critique, they could always use that, as long as 
they were prepared to answer my inevitable follow-up question: what 
if the authors had talked about radio? What would they have said?
This approach turned theory into a form of τέχνη, or technē, the 
Greek word that gives us terms such as technique and technical, and 
that we might also gloss in this context as “learning-by-doing.” 
Theory is a craft, like learning to play an instrument or learning to 
paint. Better yet, it’s a process by which we cultivate and refine our 
understanding of the world by testing our explanations of the world 
against our experience.
I used this question-argument-critique approach for half a dozen 
years before seeing that there was something else—something 
deeper—going on. That approach taught students how to read stra-
tegically, but it didn’t say what theory was. So now I begin my classes 
differently. I define theory by giving students three axioms:
1. Theory is an attempt to explain our experience of the world.
2. If the explanation theory offers doesn’t match our experience,
it’s bad theory.
(2a. In the end, it’s all bad theory.)




The first axiom is easy. We’re doing theory when we try to explain the 
world. There are many ways to explain things. Communication theor-
ists span the epistemological spectrum, from positivists anchored in 
an observable, knowable world to poststructuralists who question the 
basic assumptions that ground any claims we’d like to make.18 (Epis-
temology is the branch of philosophy that asks how we know what 
we know. It is concerned with evidence and the validity of claims.) 
I tend toward the more skeptical end of the spectrum: we can know 
the world only through the mediation of our senses. For that reason, 
I draw on ideas of theory that come from the humanities, rather 
than the social sciences. In the social sciences, the scholar’s task is 
to use the tools of method to discover something about the object of 
study. Research in the humanities—if it can be called “research” at all 
(“inquiry” or simply “scholarship” might be better)—inverts that task 
by asking the object of study to reveal something about the world. 
As John Durham Peters explains, “the point is less to illuminate” 
the texts we read “than to let them instruct us, by their distance and 
familiarity.”19 Consequently, as Jonathan Culler writes, theory in the 
humanities is interdisciplinary, analytical, and speculative (rather 
than falsifiable, as in the social sciences), and it provides a reflexive 
critique of common sense.20 
In light of these differences, we can’t evaluate humanistic theory 
as we do social scientific theory. Nowhere will we find p-values or sta-
tistical validity. Instead, we evaluate humanistic theory by testing our 
explanation, and when the explanation doesn’t match our experience, 
the theory is bad. Hence the second axiom. But let’s not be fooled. 
18 Robert Craig, “Communication Theory as a Field”; and Diana Iulia Nastasia and 
Lana F. Rakow, “What Is Theory? Puzzles and Maps as Metaphors in Communica-
tion Theory.” 
19 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication, 
36. Peters is concerned with Socrates and the Bible in the chapter I’m citing here, but 
given the approach he adopts throughout his book, I like to think that he wouldn’t 
object to my expanding his point more broadly.
20 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction, 14–15.
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This axiom has a corollary: in the end, all theory is bad theory. That is, 
no explanation is complete. Theory always fails to explain something. 
Hence the third axiom: our job is to refine our explanations to replace 
bad theory with better theory. That improved explanation will also 
fail, of course, and we’ll keep refining and refining and refining.21 In 
this way, theory and experience mediate each other: theory explains 
the world we experience even as we test it against that experience. 
When I ask my students to argue with the authors we read (and with 
me!), that refinement is what I want them to do.
In simpler terms, the approach I try to teach marks a point 
where theory and practice intersect. To do theory is to understand 
(or explain) experience. We understand experience by practicing 
theory (in both senses of the word practice—“application of a trade” 
and “repetition of a skill”). And for me, the practice of theory takes 
on another dimension: it’s teaching. It’s leading students through 
these steps so they become second nature. It’s also learning from 
students about the nature of theory as technē. I didn’t start out with 
the question-argument-critique approach but instead developed it 
in response to the difficulties my students had when I assumed they 
understood texts as I did. I had forgotten what it’s like to read difficult 
texts for the first time, and I developed the approach by thinking 
about how I myself had first encountered them. Similarly, I developed 
my three axioms in response to the way students worked through 
questions, arguments, and critiques.
As a result (as I write in the preface), this book is not a textbook, 
but it is pedagogical. It is about thinking and learning, activities in 
which we professors should be engaged as much as our students.
21 Of course, we can use social scientific approaches to critique and refine our explan-
ations. Sometimes the challenge is finding ways to overcome the incommensurability 
of different scholarly paradigms—social scientists and humanists have different ways 
of approaching the world, not to mention different senses about what constitutes evi-
dence or the types of claims it is useful to make. But this humanistic notion of theory, 
grounded in the conversation of critique and answers to critique, opens up ways to 
work through that impasse. For a sense of what this might look like from a more social 




This book is about teaching and it’s about how to change people’s 
minds. It’s a tactical guide whose two parts are linked by the challenge 
of opening people up to the possibility of seeing the world differ-
ently. Many of my students don’t like theory (or think they don’t) 
because they see no place for it in their lives. They come into my class 
filled with dread that I’ll drone on and on about arcane knowledge 
that might as well be in a foreign language where they need to know 
just enough words to get by. My job is to help them recognize their 
unspoken assumptions about how the world works, in particular 
in relation to phenomena of communication. My job is also to help 
them see that their common sense understanding of communication 
is inadequate. They have been theorizing communication all along. It 
happens every time they explain some interaction where two people 
try to exchange information or when they try to persuade each other, 
to give two obvious examples. Inevitably, their explanations—their 
theories—miss something, and I want to provide tools to help them 
refine their understanding of what is going on.
In short, I want to help them observe something they might not 
have had any reason to observe before, namely their interpretive 
horizon, or those very assumptions that ground how they under-
stand the world. (“Interpretive horizon” is a metaphor. Think of the 
horizon you see when you’re outside. You probably don’t pay much 
attention to it, but the things you do notice stand out because you 
see them against that horizon. It is in contrast to that horizon that 
they become visible. An interpretive horizon functions in the same 
way. You make assumptions about the world that are so basic you 
rarely think of them as such, but the things you do notice make sense 
because you see them against those assumptions or that horizon.) 
The task of cultural translation is the same: to prompt people to see 
what otherwise remains invisible, those basic conceptual building 
blocks that are so fundamental they fail to see them at all. Not that 
cultural translation is a type of education. To presume that it is, and 
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to presume that I have some privileged view of the world, would be 
patronizing. Instead, cultural translation and teaching are examples 
of a broader phenomenon, that of our engagement with our own 
interpretive horizons.
I approach this task through the idea of a parallax view. The term 
comes from the Greek word παράλλαξις, meaning “variant.” It refers 
to the way a set of objects looks different depending on the perspec-
tive of the viewer. Imagine you’re walking down a street, and you spot 
a cool mural painted on the side of a building. Between you and the 
mural is a pole and a large silver shed. You continue to walk to get a 
better view. The shed, because it’s closer to you, recedes quickly and 
no longer obstructs your view. The pole, which is farther from you 
than the shed but not as far as the mural, doesn’t appear to move 
out of the way as quickly. So you keep walking, and eventually it 
too no longer obstructs your view. The mural, the farthest of these 
three objects from you, doesn’t appear to move much at all, at least 
in relation to the shed and the pole. The three objects don’t change 
position in relation to each other, but your perception of them does. 
That change in perspective is the parallax view (figure 2).
This approach is useful for understanding a wide range of phe-
nomena because we can walk around other objects, too, so to speak. 
Consider the heroes in Star Wars.22 We root for the ragtag team of 
rebels as they fight the darkly powerful Empire, which in its hubris 
has built the Death Star, a battle station designed to destroy entire 
planets. We identify with the rebels, as retired U.S. Air Force Lieu-
tenant Colonel William Astore did in 1977, when the film was first 
released: “Like most young Americans then, I saw myself as a plucky 
rebel, a mixture of the free-wheeling, wisecracking Han Solo and the 
fresh-faced, idealistic Luke Skywalker.”23 But the truth is that almost 
everyone sees themselves in that role, even people on opposite sides 
22 George Lucas, dir., Star Wars (1977)—later given the subtitle A New Hope.
23 William J. Astore, “Can You Spot the American Military in Your Favorite Sci-Fi 
Film? Hint: We’re Always the Bad Guys.”
Figure 2. Three pictures of a mural that provide an example of a
parallax view. Photograph by the author. Courtesy of Amanda Osgood
Jonientz.
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of a conflict. Roy Scranton, a U.S. Army veteran who served in Iraq, 
writes of spending one Fourth of July “on the roof of a building in 
Baghdad that had once belonged to Saddam Hussein’s secret police.” 
He was thinking of Star Wars, and as he looked out over Baghdad, 
he came to see himself as he imagined Iraqis might see him: “I was 
the faceless storm trooper, and the scrappy rebels were the Iraqis.”24 
Perspective is important.
Figure 3. Mural depicting Fatty Arbuckle, a silent movie star from the 
1910s that also provides an example of parallax view, 2014. Photograph 
by the author. Artist Joel Jonientz.
This approach also helps us see why other approaches would fall 
short. Isn’t it presumptuous, you might object, to think we can—
or should—change someone else’s mind? Wouldn’t it be better to 
explore how others think so we can find some common ground for 
negotiating meaning? Perhaps. But people can understand others’ 
perspectives and still disagree. More important, even to reach the 
24 Roy Scranton, “‘Star Wars’ and the Fantasy of American Violence.”
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point where they can find common ground, they must first see 
the world from a different perspective, to understand how their 
opponents—like them!—see themselves as the rebels in Star Wars, 
too. Cultural translation remains a valuable tool to change people’s 
minds. (We will revisit this point in the book’s concluding chapter.)
Strategies of Misreading
So how do we walk around ideas to see them anew? How do we come 
to see our world so it appears a little strange? We start by recognizing 
something fundamental about the texts we read.25 We cannot know 
an author’s mind. We cannot know an author’s intention. Although 
the words the author has written might seem to represent her or his 
intention, they are open to interpretation. Words mean too many 
things. Or as Paul Ricoeur explains,
When I speak, I realize only a part of the potential signified; the 
rest is erased by the total signification of the sentence, which 
operates as the unit of speaking. But the rest of the semantic 
possibilities are not canceled; they float around the words as 
possibilities not completely eliminated.26
If this is the case, then what can we know? We can know the words we 
have in front of us, words that are assembled into a concrete, stable 
form. And we can know what others have said about them (although, 
there, too, we can know only what they’ve said, not their intentions). 
In order to walk around the text—better yet, to walk around the ideas 
within the text—it is enough to offer an interpretation that is at once 
consistent with it but different from how others have responded. 
That is, our strategy should be to misread a text by reading against 
25 My analysis in this section is indebted to Sarah Maitland’s What Is Cultural Trans-
lation?




the interpretations that people have had before. We must misread 
strategically, so that misreading becomes a more sophisticated type 
of cultural translation. It is a more strategic type of exchange than 
in my illustration above, one that has value when one of the people 
in the exchange is resistant to the idea that things might be other 
than she or he imagines them.
That is the exercise I undertake in the rest of this book. In chapter 
1, I misread Stuart Hall’s “Encoding/Decoding.” Hall was concerned 
with a common sense way of thinking about television, one related 
to the classic sender-message-receiver model of communication. He 
read against this model in ways that influenced the entire field of 
media and cultural studies, where scholars have spent a lot of time 
looking at how viewers decode television. I read against those schol-
ars to arrive at a new interpretation of “Encoding/Decoding,” namely 
that every time we speak or write, we are in fact translating. We are 
substituting one use of a word (ours) for another (that of the person 
we’re talking to). This misreading serves two purposes: it simultan-
eously illustrates and authorizes the strategy I advocate.
Thus the first chapter focuses on communication theory in order 
to show how misreading can be a conceptual tool. The second chapter 
looks for theory in an unexpected place: George Orwell’s treatise on 
language, appended to his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. If my mis-
reading of Hall suggests ways cultural translation can open new 
horizons, my misreading of Orwell’s book—not as a novel with a 
treatise on language appended but as a translation manual with a 
novel appended—shows how it can also close them off.
The chapters that follow are about how people have used these 
tools to induce a parallax view in others. Chapter 3 describes how 
they have used art to do so in constructive ways. It focuses on a Rus-
sian artist who shocks his audiences by subjecting himself to great 
pain in very public performances, giving them a new perspective to 
ground their view of the world (and changing the mind even of one 
of the cops sent to interrogate him). His tactic is conceptually simple: 
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he asks viewers to reconsider their ideas about his actions, some of 
which break the law, in light of a different higher-order principle—to 
see them in the context of ethics rather than crime and punishment. 
Chapter 4 describes the opposite: it is about perspective unmoored. 
It is about the odd path taken by the phrase fake news after the 2016 
U.S. election. In the days following the vote, the phrase described 
stories that were made up. People wanted to encourage others to pay 
attention real news—to things that actually happened. But the new 
president of the United States quickly took the phrase and used it to 
evoke something different. He used it whenever he disagreed with 
a story, creating a space of extreme relativism, where the criteria 
people used to evaluate claims about the world had less to do with 
evidence and more to do with whether they agreed politically with 
the people making the claims.
Finally, the last chapter returns to where the book began. It offers 
a metatheoretical account of the performative dimensions of my 
argument (that is, it relates the form of my argument back to the 
question, what is theory?). It proposes an epistemology of jumping 
in: if theory is a foreign language, the best way to learn it is through 
immersion. Even if we don’t have all the tools we need, necessity 
helps us discover them as we go. (Not coincidentally, cultural trans-
lation is also best understood from this standpoint.) It’s for that 
reason that throughout the book, I try to provoke as much as to 
explain. I give examples to encourage an inductive form of reasoning 
so students will do the work of connecting ideas themselves. Thus in 
the conclusion I look at the ways this book develops an explanation of 
communication and at applications of the tools it identifies. I want to 
help students see how theory encourages a parallax view of the world, 
not to mention communication. The final chapter connects the dots, 




Communication Is Translation 
(So Please Mind the Gap)
What you are reading is a translation. It began as a lesson in one of 
my classes, replete with slides, and now I have turned it into a book 
chapter.
No, that’s not right. It began much earlier. My lesson reworked 
a keynote talk I gave at a conference, and my keynote reworked an 
opaque theoretical article I published in the International Journal 
of Communication.1 And that article reworked Stuart Hall’s encod-
ing/decoding model to see what it had to reveal about translation. 
(For that matter, so does this chapter.) And Hall’s model reworked 
Marx’s take on political economy in the Grundrisse. (And the Grun-
drisse reworked older versions of political economy, which reworked 
. . . which reworked . . . which reworked . . . )
In other words, there is no single point of origin. What you are 
reading is the result of one long series of transformations and sub-
stitutions: encoding/decoding substitutes for the Grundrisse; my 
1 Kyle Conway, “Encoding/Decoding as Translation.” But even this genealogy is not 
quite right. There is an intermediate step: an earlier version of this chapter appeared 
as “Communication Is Translation, or, How to Mind the Gap” in Palabra Clave 20, 
no. 3 (2017): 622–44. It is reproduced here with the kind permission of the journal.
1
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article substitutes for encoding/decoding; my keynote substitutes 
for my article; my lesson substitutes for my keynote; and now, this 
chapter substitutes for my lesson. It is a translation. It could not 
be otherwise.
It is no coincidence I’m describing it as a translation. My pur-
pose here is to demonstrate the strategy of the parallax view by 
asking what would happen if cultural studies scholars talked about 
translation. Or, more to the point, what would a theory of trans-
lation look like if it were grounded in the field of cultural studies? 
The answer I give is as performative as it is expository. That is, the 
logic that shapes my answer also applies to this chapter itself, in 
that it shapes its form. Like every other form of discourse, this 
chapter participates in an economy of substitution—of trading 
words, sentences, and ideas for other words, sentences, and ideas. 
When I speak of translation, that trading is what I mean, and in 
that respect, my opening examples are strategic: they show how 
translation works before I even say what I think it is. The examples 
I choose in the sections that follow are also strategic: they illustrate 
a key relationship between signs by moving between semiotic sys-
tems (for example, between words and pictures or between formal 
and informal linguistic registers).
So what, then, is that relationship? What exactly is translation? 
To answer that question, I propose three axioms:
1. To use a sign is to transform it.
2. To transform a sign is to translate it.
3. Communication is translation.
In the following sections, I approach these axioms by providing two 
parallax views. I begin by describing an early model of communica-
tion—the sender-message-receiver model—developed by electrical 
engineers in the 1940s as a way to improve the telephone networks 
they were building. Then, to work through these axioms, I peer at 
the sender-message-receiver model from a different angle, the one 
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provided by Stuart Hall’s “Encoding/Decoding.”2 It serves as the basis 
for a materialist approach to semiotics, which in turn provides the 
conceptual tools to take a new look at “Encoding/Decoding” itself. 
The point is to pry open the act of speaking and responding to see 
how signs are transformed when we use them. Taking my cues from 
Hall, whose essay has had a profound impact on scholarly notions of 
politics, I finish by arguing that the transformation and substitution 
of signs opens up a space for a politics of invention, where we can 
rethink our relation to cultural others so that people we once feared 
can find their place in the communities we claim as our own.
Sender-Message-Receiver
One of the most influential models of communication developed 
from efforts by electrical engineers in the 1940s to find ways to 
make telephones work better. They were asking a technical ques-
tion, namely how to overcome the noise that interfered with the 
transmission of information, especially as telephone lines got longer 
and noise increased. They wanted to calculate the point where signals 
were transmitted with maximum efficiency, but they had to balance 
efficiency with redundancy. The most efficient transmission would 
be one where each element of a message is sent once, but only once. 
The problem is that the channels used for transmission introduce 
extraneous signals. If each element is sent only once, the receiver 
has no way to know whether it has been corrupted because there is 
no way to confirm that the message received is right. (The receiver 
would have to ask “Did you say . . . ?” and then repeat the message, 
thus sending it more than once.) Think of the children’s game of 
telephone, where one person whispers a message to a second, who 
2 See Stuart Hall, “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,” and “Encod-
ing/Decoding.”
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whispers it to a third, who whispers it to a fourth, and so on.3 It’s an 
efficient system (each person whispers the message once), but the 
message the last person receives is always garbled. And since there 
is no feedback from one person to the next, the last person cannot 
know for sure whether (or where) it is garbled until the first person 
tells everyone what she or he said.
One solution to this problem is to build in forms of redundancy, 
especially in the form of feedback, although doing so makes the 
transmission less efficient. Imagine again our game of telephone. 
If the second person repeated the message back to the first, making 
sure to get it exactly right, and then the third person repeated it back 
to the second, and the fourth to the third, and so on, the message 
would likely be less garbled when it arrived, but it would take much 
longer for it to work its way down the line.
To solve the problems they faced in the 1940s, engineers proposed 
the sender-message-receiver model. Claude Shannon published the 
first iteration in 1948, which Warren Weaver helped popularize in the 
years that followed. A transmitter, they said, transforms informa-
tion into a message that can be sent through a channel like a copper 
wire. The receiver then transforms the message back into its original 
form. Or, to use Weaver’s terms, “The function of the transmitter is 
to encode, and that of the receiver to decode, the message” (figure 
4).4 But just as in the example above, no transmission is exact. There 
is always noise, and it takes feedback from the receiver to the trans-
mitter to be confident the information is transmitted correctly, or at 
least that any corruption is kept to a minimum, as Shannon showed 
with a set of mathematical formulas for determining the optimal 
levels of efficiency and redundancy.
Although this model has been influential in communication 
theory, it has drawbacks. The most important, from a cultural studies 
3 My Canadian students call this game “broken telephone.” That name seems better 
suited to the way messages break down.
4 Warren Weaver, “The Mathematics of Communication,” 13.
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point of view, is that the “semantic aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering problem.”5 In other words, Shannon was 
concerned only with the reliable transmission of information, which 
for him could be any set of symbols, whether they were imbued with 
meaning or not. He was not concerned with content, which could 
be “fsd jklrwiouv kldf sa” (a string of letters I produced by smash-
ing my fingers on the keyboard) just as well as “To sleep, perchance 
to dream.” In either case, the engineering problem remained the 
same. (Weaver, to be fair, did address the possibility of meaning in 
his efforts to popularize Shannon’s model. “The formal diagram of a 
communication system,” he wrote, “can, in all likelihood, be extended 
to include the central issues of meaning and effectiveness.”)6
Figure 4. Sender-message-receiver model developed by Shannon 
and Weaver showing the steps of message transmission. Adapted from 
Weaver (1949, p. 12–13).
The question of meaning would be Stuart Hall’s point of de par ture, 
the pivot around which he would walk to see the sender-message- 
receiver model from a new perspective.
Theoretical Foundations: A Materialist Approach to Semiotics
The axioms I propose above have two starting points: material-
ism (a philosophical stance that grounds analysis in people’s lived 
5 C. E. Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” 379.
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experience) and semiotics (the study of how meaning functions).7 The 
materialism comes, as mentioned in the introduction, from Stuart 
Hall’s reaction to the sender-message-receiver model in his essay 
“Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,” better known 
in its revised form, “Encoding/Decoding.” Hall argues that television 
programs are only one moment in a circuit that links producers and 
viewers in a specific social context. The meaning with which they 
imbue a program is grounded in this context.
The encoding/decoding model, in fact, is an application of Marx’s 
political economy, as laid out in his introduction to the Grundrisse.8 
Marx’s insight was that production and consumption were not 
independent moments in the circulation of commodities but were, 
on the contrary, mutually constitutive—one could not exist with-
out the other. On the one hand, to give an example, the objects a 
cobbler produces become a pair of shoes in a meaningful sense only 
when someone puts them on her or his feet. In this way, the act of 
consumption is implicated in the act of production. On the other, 
the cobbler produces shoes in such a way as to influence how people 
wear them, by altering materials and styles to create a demand. In 
this way, production is implicated in the act of consumption.
Hall extends this analysis to television. He describes the moments 
of production and consumption—“encoding” and “decoding”—as 
mutually constitutive. (Note the common language with Shannon 
and Weaver.) Producers encode certain meanings into shows, but 
viewers do not necessary decode them as intended. Nonetheless, 
the moments of production and consumption are linked in that pro-
ducers anticipate viewers’ reactions, and viewers interpret shows in 
7 Note how this use of the term materialism (which derives from Marx’s work) 
differs from our everyday sense of materialism as an undue focus on material goods 
at the expense of relationships with people that fulfill us on a deeper level. This is 
one point where I must ask my students—my first readers—to remember that I am 
using the word differently. Otherwise, this discussion is likely to be confusing.
8 Karl Marx, “Introduction,” in Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political 
Economy, esp. sec. (2).
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part based on their knowledge of producers. The shows themselves 
are complex signs that link producers and viewers, who also operate 
within a shared social context. 
In short, production and consumption are linked in a relationship 
of mutual dependence. Hall frames these forms of mutual influence 
as a circuit, which he illustrates in figure 5.
Note that I have adapted the figure Hall presents in the earlier 
version of his essay (from 1973), which differs from its better known 
counterpart (in “Encoding/Decoding” from 1980) in one import-
ant way: it has an arrow that runs from the factors that influence 
decoding to those that influence encoding. In other words, it com-
pletes the circuit by making the influence of decoding on encoding 
explicit.
Figure 5. Encoding/decoding model by Hall showing the circuit of 
meaning generated in a television program. Illustration by Stuart Hall, 
“Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,” CCCS Stencilled 
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Also note the way Hall’s diagram looks like the sender-message- 
receiver model, but all stretched out and twisted. Shannon and Weaver 
were concerned with how a channel transmitted information. Hall 
is concerned with how a program becomes a channel, or better yet 
a medium, for transmitting meaning. But he also draws the idea of 
transmission into question. Shannon and Weaver were concerned with 
the steps a transmitter took to encode information and the steps the 
receiver took to decode it. Hall breaks the moments of transmission 
and reception down by looking at the factors that shape them, relative 
to people’s frameworks of knowledge, the structures of production in 
which they are embedded, and the technical infrastructure available 
to them. By peering at the sender-message-receiver model from a dif-
ferent angle, one where meaning predominates, he helps us see that 
Shannon and Weaver’s primary question—how can we transmit infor-
mation with the least distortion?—is not the right question at all, at 
least not if we are concerned with meanings that are contested.
Hall’s attention to the factors that influence encoding and decod-
ing, which all relate to the material conditions of textual production 
and meaning-making, is what makes his model materialist. Never-
theless, the psychological aspects of meaning—how programs evoke 
ideas for viewers—remain unclear. Hence my second starting point, 
the idea of a sign. Here I draw on American philosopher Charles 
Peirce, who says,
A sign . . . is something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, cre-
ates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a 
more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the inter-
pretant of the first sign.9
Consider my stick-figure heroes in figure 6. The star spoken by Hero 
1 (on the left) is the sign because it evokes something for Hero 2 (on 
the right). And the ideas it evokes for Hero 2 are also signs, as they 
9 Charles Peirce, The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings, 99.
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evoke still more ideas, which evoke more, and more, and more. (My 
image cannot capture the full chain of associations.) This is what 
Peirce means when he speaks of the interpretant.10
Figure 6. A sign used by Hero 1 evokes a series of interpretants for 
Hero 2. Drawn by the author.
It is useful to make a distinction here between the material and 
subjective aspects of the sign. On the one hand, there is the material 
side—the specific patterns of vibrating sound that hit our eardrums 
in the case of a word, for instance, or the patterns of light and sound 
in the case of a television program, or Hero 1’s star.11 On the other, 
there is the subjective side—what a speaker or producer hopes to 
evoke by using a given material sign (a word, a TV program, etc.), and 
what that material sign evokes for a listener or viewer, as in the case 
of Hero 2’s chain of associations. The subjective aspect of the sign 
consists in the string of interpretants evoked by the material sign.12
10 If my heroes bring to mind Randall Munroe’s brilliant webcomic xkcd (https://
xkcd.com), then they are signs and xkcd is their interpretant.
11 Peirce would call this material sign the representamen. For an overview of Peirce’s 
terminology, see Floyd Merrell, “Charles Sanders Peirce’s Concept of the Sign,” 29–39.
12 This distinction between “material” and “subjective” signs needs clarifica-
tion. First, it looks like Ferdinand de Saussure’s distinction (in Course in General 
Hero 1 Hero 2
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Axiom 1: To Use a Sign Is to Transform It
How does a materialist approach drawn from Marx’s political econ-
omy and from 1970s-era reactions to a 1940s-era engineering problem 
relate to the idea of a sign made up of material and subjective parts? 
As Hall demonstrates, the televisual sign links producers and viewers. 
Its meaning is a point of negotiation between them, which is shaped 
by their knowledge and expectations of each other. But this nego-
tiation over meaning is not unique to television. V. N. Vološinov, in 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, argues that we negotiate the 
meaning of every sign. He gives the example of a word: 
A word presents itself not as an item of vocabulary but as a word 
that has been used in a wide variety of utterances by co-speaker 
A, co-speaker B, co-speaker C and so on, and has been variously 
used in the speaker’s own utterances.13
So when Hero 1 on the left uses a sign (figure 7), Hero 2 on the right 
responds by taking into account how Hero 1 used it (figure 8). If Hero 
2 uses it again, it is with the earlier exchange in mind, at least partially.
But we are more than just reactive: when we talk to people, we are 
also predictive. As Mikhail Bakhtin points out:
When constructing my utterance, I try actively to determine 
this response [that is, the response of the person I am talking 
to]. Moreover, I try to act in accordance with the response I 
Linguistics) between signifier and signified, but it is not. Strictly speaking, Saussure’s 
signifiers are “sound images,” whereas material signs exist in the world outside 
speakers’ psyches. Similarly, Saussure’s signifieds are concepts evoked by sound 
images, but they do not operate in a chain, as in Peirce’s conception. Second, I 
have chosen not to call material signs “objective” (as the inverse of “subjective”) 
because the term would be misleading to the degree it implied that the meanings of 
materials signs were fixed. Finally, this distinction is only heuristic. V. N. Vološinov 
(in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language) demonstrates that material conditions 
always impinge on our subjective experience of language, so much so that language 
is a material fact that exists outside of speakers’ individual psyches.
13 Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 70.
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anticipate, so this anticipated response, in turn, exerts an active 
influence on my utterance (I parry objections that I foresee, I 
make all kinds of provisos, and so forth).14
Figure 7. Hero 1 asks Hero 2 a question. Drawn by the author.
Figure 8. Hero 2 answers the question posed by Hero 1, using Hero 1’s 
word in a subtly changed context. Drawn by the author.
In other words, just as TV producers (according to Hall) shape 
their programs in partial anticipation of what viewers will think, 
we shape our utterances (whatever form they might take) in partial 
14 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 95.
Hero 1 Hero 2
Hero 1 Hero 2
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anticipation of how others will react. (And we do so in a given social 
context, to return to Hall’s model.)
Thus our heroes continue to pass a word back and forth, each time 
reacting to what the other has said and taking that reaction into 
account. Perhaps they have a discussion. Perhaps Hero 2 is really a 
jerk, or maybe just clumsy with Hero 1’s feelings. Maybe Hero 2 is 
not really a hero at all (figure 9). So Hero 1 leaves, while Hero 2 calls 
after Hero 1 in vain (figure 10).
Figure 9. Hero 1 responds to Hero 2, repeating the same word in a 
still-evolving context, and concludes that Hero 2 is a jerk. Drawn by the 
author.
And, finally, Hero 2 is left to replay the scene, to figure out what 
went wrong. The sign means something for Hero 2 that it did not 
mean before. At the beginning of the conversation, it did not evoke 
regret or puzzlement, and now it does (figure 11). This is what I mean 
when I say “to use a sign is to transform it.” The material aspect of 
a sign may remain the same over the course of an exchange, but the 
subjective aspect does not. And if the material aspect is one side of a 
sign, and the subjective aspect the other, then the pair has changed. 
Hero 1 Hero 2
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The sign—the pair together, as a unit—is different from what it was 
before.15
Figure 10. Hero 1 has had enough and walks away. Hero 2 objects to 
Hero 1’s conclusion about their exchange. Drawn by the author.
Figure 11. Now alone, Hero 2 considers the exchange with Hero 1 and 
wonders what went wrong. Drawn by the author.
15 My formulation here seems to suggest a constantly expanding interpretant, but 
that’s not necessarily the case. People stop using signs in certain circumstances, too. 
Meanings can contract, as chapter 4 shows in the case of the phrase fake news before 
and immediately following the 2016 U.S. election.
Hero 1 Hero 2
Hero 2
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Axiom 2: To Transform a Sign Is to Translate It
And so we arrive at my second axiom: to transform a sign is to trans-
late it.
Perhaps this axiom appears counterintuitive or based on a notion 
of translation that I have had to wrangle and contort. In fact, the 
opposite is true. What do I mean by translation? Exactly what it 
means in a conventional sense—the substitution of one sign (or 
one set of signs) for another. We transform signs by using them: 
their subjective dimension changes because Hero 2 has to take into 
account the use by Hero 1, something Hero 1 did not have to do. Thus 
the transformed sign substitutes for the sign that came before. The 
change might be small (in fact, most of the time it is), but we can 
also imagine more dramatic cases, such as when Hero 1 tells Hero 
2 something life-changing, and Hero 2 must make sense of a new 
configuration of their symbolic universe. (By “symbolic universe” 
I mean the ordered set of beliefs people have that shape how they 
make sense of objects and events.) Think of Luke Skywalker in The 
Empire Strikes Back.16 The sign father changes dramatically when he 
learns who Darth Vader really is.
Or think of how the sign translation has changed for you since 
the beginning of this chapter. As you think of questions you want to 
ask and points you want me to clarify, you are taking into account 
what I have said. The chain of associations—that is, the inter-
pretants—the sign translation evokes for you has grown. Perhaps 
not dramatically, but it is larger nonetheless. The subjective aspect 
of the sign has changed, which means the material/subjective pair 
as a unit has changed. I have substituted a new use of the term 
for an older use. At the risk of being too clever, I would say I have 
translated translation.
16 Irvin Kershner, dir., The Empire Strikes Back (1980).
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Axiom 3: Communication Is Translation
Here we arrive at my third axiom: “Communication is translation.” 
In all truth, the first two axioms form a syllogism, from which the 
third derives. If we use a sign, we transform it. If we transform a sign, 
we translate it. Therefore, if we use a sign—that is, if we communi-
cate—we translate it. In other words (what a revealing phrase—“in 
other words”), communication is translation.
In some ways, this assertion is not new. George Steiner, in his 
influential book After Babel, argues,
Any model of communication is at the same time a model of 
translation, of a vertical or horizontal transfer of significance. 
No two historical epochs, no two social classes, no two localities 
use words and syntax to signify the same things, to send iden-
tical signals of valuation and inference. Neither do two human 
beings.17
Paul Ricoeur, in On Translation, goes further. Because the sign I use 
never evokes the exact same thing for you as for me, we constantly 
misunderstand each other. We say what we have to say, but then we 
also have to explain what we mean. Sometimes we have to explain 
our explanation, until we are as satisfied as we can be that we have 
gotten our message through: 
It is always possible to say the same thing in another way. . . . That 
is why we have never ceased making ourselves clear, making our-
selves clear with words and sentences, making ourselves clear to 
others who do not see things from the same angle as we do.18
Language is reflexive, and tant mieux—if we could not talk about 
what we mean, especially when we see that our point has not gotten 
through, communication would grind to a halt.
17 George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, 47.
18 Paul Ricoeur, On Translation, 25–27.
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Note, however, that Steiner and Ricoeur make an assumption that 
I do not. They presume there is an active agent, someone thinking 
about the meaning of signs, in that they are explaining, “When I 
said X, what I really meant was . . . ” In effect, they are translating 
X by “say[ing] the same thing in another way.” But if each use of a 
sign transforms it, then there is no need for an active agent. Trans-
formation and translation take place whether we think about what 
signs mean or not. Hero 1 says “*” and Hero 2 adds that use to their 
series of interpretants, so when Hero 2 says “*” it is not an identical 
sign (figure 12).
Figure 12. The meaning of a word evolves as two people converse, 
illustrating how translation takes the form of transformative 
substitution. Drawn by the author.
A Politics of Invention
Why dwell on this seemingly minor point? As Stuart Hall showed 
with television, the gap between the producer’s intended meaning 
and the meaning a show evokes for a viewer is the condition of 
possibility for acts of resistance. Because we are intelligent human 
beings, and because we have our own experience which differs from 
that of the people who produce television, we do not have to agree 
with what we see on TV. In fact, we can take what we see and arrive 
at radically different—and equally plausible—interpretations as we 
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reconfigure meanings to match with our experience and meet our 
expectations.
That idea of resistance leads me to a further observation: the gap 
between signs is productive, something we can put to use. We must 
(as the London Underground reminds us) mind the gap. How do we 
do that? That question is the point of this book, which approaches it 
as an empirical question: how have people put that gap to use? How 
have they used it to persuade others to see the world differently? 
These questions get to the heart of what rhetoricians, drawing on 
Aristotle, describe as invention (or inventio in Latin), by which they 
mean the generation of arguments.19 It is one of five steps in the pro-
cess of crafting a persuasive speech, the other four of which include 
arranging arguments (dispositio in Latin), matching them stylistically 
to the audience (elocutio), remembering them (memoria), and finally 
delivering them effectively (pronuntiatio). (We will explore Aristotle’s 
notion of invention in more depth in chapter 3.)
Aristotle says that rhetoric is the art of persuasion, or “the faculty 
of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion,” 
and rhetorical invention is the ability to find the right words in a 
particular context.20 In this sense, persuasion is contingent on 
circumstances, which change from one situation to the next. It is 
grounded in the moment of speaking and therefore not knowable 
in advance. It is a matter of mastering different tools that help you 
think on your toes.
My contention is that the gap between a speaker’s sign and a listen-
er’s sign is a space where we can practice a specific type of invention. 
19 We tend not to use invention this way in everyday speech. I anticipate that 
one challenge for my students will be to accept that the term means something 
other than what they expect. My use of this older sense risks falling into the trap I 
describe in the first paragraph of the introductory chapter, namely, that it will have 
no place within their pre-existing symbolic universe. That is, if they read it as inven-
tion in a contemporary sense—say, some scientific innovation for which one might 
receive a patent—the argument I’m presenting will be confusing. They will need to 
set aside what they know to see the term from a new angle.
20 Aristotle, Rhetoric, book I, part 2.
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Cultural translation, as a number of people have observed, has a 
certain utopian potential.21 For instance, it opens up the possibility 
for acts of hospitality by allowing us to speak against the hegemonic 
norms of identity that prevent people who appear different or foreign 
from joining “our” group, whichever it is. It is a matter of identifying 
the “available means of persuasion.” This act is fundamentally cre-
ative, and it has important ethical implications.
Let me illustrate with an example, which comes from Bertolt 
Brecht, by way of translation studies scholars Boris Buden and Stefan 
Nowotny.22 In his poem “The Democratic Judge,” Brecht describes an 
Italian immigrant to the United States who is applying for citizen-
ship, although he does not speak English. The man stands before the 
judge, and the judge asks him questions about the United States as 
part of a citizenship test. “What is the eighth amendment?” the judge 
asks. “1492,” he answers because he does not understand.
The setting of the exchange is symbolically important. The appli-
cant is asking for admission into a new national community. It is 
the culmination of a long process of asking—from immigration, to 
integration (in different senses, as he does not speak English), to 
finally making a formal request. Thus when he is refused, according 
to Buden and Nowotny, it is a literal refusal of his symbolic request, 
one more refusal on top of all the others he has faced since arriving 
in his new home.
So the man returns later, and the judge asks another question. 
“Who was the winning general of the Civil War?”
Again the man answers, “1492.” Again, he is refused.
He returns a third time, and the scene repeats itself. “How long 
do presidents serve?” “1492.”
But something happens for the judge. It is a moment of invention. 
When the man returns a fourth time, according to Brecht:
21 Most notably, Homi Bhabha makes this argument in The Location of Culture.




The judge, who liked the man, realised that he could not
Learn the new language, asked him
How he earned his living and was told: by hard work. And so
At his fourth appearance the judge gave him the question:
When
Was America discovered? And on the strength of his correctly 
answering
1492, he was granted his citizenship.23
The judge looks at the situation and assesses it. He looks at the tools 
available to him. He is a judge, so he cannot break the law, but he 
takes pity on the man and decides the United States would be better 
for having him as a citizen. Given those constraints, he contrives 
a question—one that is in line with all those he has already asked, 
although today it would be a bit anachronistic—that the man can 
answer. The judge has worked within the constraints imposed on him 
to make a stranger no longer strange, a new member of the national 
community.
Buden and Nowotny say that the judge has found “a correct ques-
tion” for “a wrong answer.”24 The judge has taken advantage of the gap 
between one use of the sign 1492 and the next. Over the course of his 
interactions with the man, the sign 1492 has come to have a richer 
set of interpretants. In each case, but especially in the question that 
sets up the final, “correct” use, he has taken his previous interactions 
with the man into account. Hence the expanded set of associations 
(figure 13). What is important is that the judge finds a way to make 
the evolution of the sign’s meaning productive—it becomes a tool in 
an act of inclusion. It is not hard to think of other situations where 
such invention has value, or where scholars can use this idea to gain 
insight into our interactions with groups who are marked as “differ-
ent” or “foreign.”
23 Brecht, quoted in Buden and Nowotny, “Cultural Translation,” 206–7.
24 Ibid., 207.
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Figure 13. Bertolt Brecht’s judge devises the correct question for a 
wrong answer. Illustration of judge adapted from Ward (1899, “Men of 




How long do 
presidents serve?
1492.
Who won the 
Civil War?
What is the 8th 
Amendment?
1492.
When was America 
discovered?
1492.
How long do 
presidents serve?
1492.
Who won the 
Civil War?




Who won the 
Civil War?
What is the 8th 
Amendment?
1492.





Conclusion: The Logic of Substitution-Transformation
In this chapter’s introduction, I wrote that this chapter is a trans-
lation, a reworking of a lesson, which reworked an article, which 
reworked . . . which reworked . . . which reworked. . . . Why have I 
made the same argument more than once? What is the value of the 
repetition? What does this version offer that older versions (or past 
links in the chain) did not?
One answer to these questions is relatively superficial. My earlier 
elaboration relied on a deductive mode of reasoning.25 It was a series 
of literal and implied “if-then” statements. I crafted the version you 
have just read to rely more on induction—I proceed by examples 
and build to my conclusions from there. I hope this version achieves 
a different effect—I hope it left blanks that you filled in. In short, I 
hope it demonstrated invention as much as explained it.
Another answer goes still further. In this chapter’s introduction I 
also wrote, What would a theory of translation look like if it were grounded 
in the field of cultural studies? The answer I give is as performative as it 
is expository. That is, the logic that shapes my answer also applies to this 
chapter itself, in that it shapes its form. How does this logic apply? 
This question and these statements are signs, by Peirce’s definition, 
in that they “stand to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity.” Their use here differs from their use in my introduction, if 
I have succeeded in my translation, because they evoke something 
new for you. The first time, I had hinted at but not laid out the logic 
of transformation-substitution. You had to take my assertion on 
faith. Now, I hope, it stands on its own merits.
This logic is what authorizes the theoretical moves I make in the 
following chapters. The parallax views I produce or describe depend 
on the multiplicity of meanings of any given sign, which comes about 
because of the transformation signs undergo with each use. We can 
gaze at meaning from another angle because signs always mean more 
25 Conway, “Encoding/Decoding as Translation.”
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than what the people who use them intend, a semiotic excess that 
provides an excess of perspectives, if we choose to explore them.
In sum, the questions of invention that follow from this con-
ception of translation are ones I think we should be asking in the 
fields of communication and cultural studies. If we develop a theory 
of translation that responds to our concerns, and if we bring the 
tools we have developed to bear on such a theory, we can conceive 
new approaches to politics and ethics. In a world where the forces of 
globalization are constantly accelerating, and where we come into 
greater and greater contact with people unlike ourselves, few tasks 
could be as important as this one.
But nothing guarantees our success, and as I write in the next 
chapter, the same logic of transformation-substitution can close off 
the very potential that invention seems to open up.
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Newspeak as a Manual  
for Translation
The last chapter ends on a hopeful note: cultural translation is the 
tool we use to shift people’s perspectives so they see the world dif-
ferently. It’s a technique for opening a space where we can welcome 
people who aren’t like us, whom we’ve excluded in the past.
But there’s a risk in that perception. It leaves open the question 
of who “we” are. I’m presuming my readers are like me in that they 
want to overcome the divisions we impose upon the world when we 
separate people into categories like us and them. That assumption is 
false. If recent politics has shown anything, it’s that people are wor-
ried about outsiders causing them to lose their identity. They want 
to maintain those categories. The Rassemblement national in France 
(formerly the Front national), the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
in Austria, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and the UK 
Independence Party in Great Britain have all made electoral gains 
by appealing to nativist sentiments and exploiting people’s fears of 
outsiders.1
There’s a second risk to consider. The processes of transforma-
tion described in the last chapter work in more than one direction. 
1 See Kyle Conway, “Modern Hospitality.”
2
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Cultural translation—the replacement of one sign by another—can 
close down the potential for exchange, too. It can make oppression 
possible. It can exclude.
This chapter is about that second direction. It’s about George 
Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, which tells the story of a man’s 
struggle in a dystopian future where free thought is no longer pos-
sible, having been undermined by linguistic engineering, probing 
surveillance, and unrelenting violence. This chapter focuses on the 
appendix “The Principles of Newspeak,” which describes the purpose 
of the novel’s invented language as making “heretical thought”—that 
is, any thought not consistent with the ideology of the totalitarian 
government—“literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is 
dependent on words” (Nineteen Eighty-Four, 198).2 In that respect, 
it shifts our perspective on Nineteen Eighty-Four by treating it as a 
translation manual with a novel appended. “The Principles of New-
speak” is about how to replace words strategically to reduce the 
range of things people can think, which is to say, to translate them. 
The novel illustrates the ends to which such translation can be put, 
especially when its practitioners also have the means to surveil and 
torture those who think beyond the parameters set by the author-
ities. It serves as a warning about the logic of cultural translation, 
whose utopian potential is always held in check by a “fearful asym-
metry” that comes about when people with power seek to impose 
their will on others.3
This chapter proceeds in the same way as the last. It starts by 
describing who Orwell was and how people have tended to read his 
work. Then it shifts perspective to bring about a parallax view. After 
2 All page numbers in this chapter’s in-text citations come from the critical edition 
edited by Irving Howe, Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four: Text, Sources, Criticism. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four is in the public domain in some jurisdictions, including Canada, 
where the full text is available on the website of the Gutenberg project, http://guten-
berg.ca/ebooks/orwellg-nineteeneightyfour/orwellg-nineteeneightyfour-00-h.html.




it misreads Nineteen Eighty-Four, it shifts once more. All is not lost, 
and in the places where the novel goes beyond its appendix, we come 
to see that the power of surveillance and violence is not as absolute 
as it appears.
George Orwell and Nineteen Eighty-Four
George Orwell was the pen name of Eric Blair, who was born in 1903 
and died in 1950. He was a prolific essayist and novelist and a harsh 
critic of totalitarianism and socialism, especially as it was being 
institutionalized in Europe after the Second World War. As a writer, 
he was known for his straightforward style and avoidance of “dying 
metaphors,” “pretentious diction,” and “meaningless words,” as he 
explained in his essay “Politics and the English Language.”4
Orwell is best known for his novels Animal Farm, a parable about 
animals who overthrow their human masters only to become human 
themselves, and Nineteen Eighty-Four, about everyman Winston 
Smith and his struggles against a state ruled by the Party and led by 
a figurehead called Big Brother. It was published in 1949, as “British 
capitalism was indeed merging with socialism under the guidance of 
Fabian social planners, and was doing so as welfarism.”5 It introduced 
an enduring set of ideas about language and government, such as the 
Thought Police (the all-powerful enforcers of orthodoxy who caused 
people to live “in the assumption that every sound you made was 
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized” 
[4]) and doublethink (the practice of holding “simultaneously two 
opinions which canceled out, knowing them to be contradictory and 
believing both of them” [25]).
The story Nineteen Eighty-Four tells is part romance, part thriller, 
part morality tale. Winston Smith lives in the oppressive super-state 
of Oceania, one of three that control virtually the whole world. The 
4 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” 251–52.
5 Simon During, “More Orwell.”
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other two are Eurasia and Eastasia. Oceania includes most of the 
English-speaking world along with South America, while Eurasia 
includes Europe and the northern parts of the former Soviet Union, 
and Eastasia includes the southern parts of the Soviet Union along 
with China, India, and Pakistan. They are in a perpetual state of war, 
although alliances often shift. The war is unwinnable, and its real pur-
pose, as Winston learns, is to provide social stability and structure 
by creating clear categories of us and them.
Oceania is ruled by the Party. Its elite members—the Inner 
Party—make up about 2 percent of the population. Its non-elite 
members—the Outer Party—make up about 13 percent. 
Non-members—the proles—make up the remaining 85 percent. The 
Party administers the government through four ministries. The Min-
istry of Truth produces the lies that allow the Party to maintain its 
power. (It also produces the saccharine pop songs and tawdry books 
that pacify the proles.) The Ministry of Peace runs Oceania’s endless 
war, first with Eurasia, later with Eastasia. The Ministry of Plenty 
oversees rationing. Finally, the Ministry of Love tortures anyone who 
resists the will of the Party.
Winston rebels against the Party with his lover Julia. They are 
both Outer Party members, and they ally themselves with O’Brien, 
“a large, burly man with a thick neck and a coarse, humorous, brutal 
face [who] had a trick of resettling his spectacles on his nose which 
was curiously disarming” (9). He is an Inner Party member who 
claims to be part of the Brotherhood, a resistance movement osten-
sibly led by a disgraced Party leader, but in fact he is loyal to the 
Party. His invitation to Winston and Julia is a trap. Winston and 
Julia never know if the Brotherhood really exists, or whether it 
was just a rumour O’Brien used to lure them in. When Winston 
is incarcerated in the Ministry of Love, O’Brien is his torturer, 
and he causes Winston to betray his love for Julia. The book ends 
with Winston sitting in a café, shedding tears of joy because he has 
finally overcome his resistance to the Party. Just as an assassin’s 
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bullet—which O’Brien promised him would come—enters his brain, 
“Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it 
was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He 
had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother” (197). In 
that respect, Nineteen Eighty-Four is like Orwell’s other novels that 
end with their “alienated heroes losing their individuality and being 
reconciled to the social order.”6
Interpretations of Nineteen Eighty-Four
How have readers interpreted Nineteen Eighty-Four? The story is 
rich enough for many to find in it warnings about their own polit-
ical circumstances. It is not hard, for instance, to find examples of 
doublethink in the words of the politicians one opposes. (Chapter 4 
of this book describes how some Americans have interpreted Donald 
Trump’s presidency through the lens of Orwell’s book.)
The same was true of the book when it first appeared. Early 
reviewers debated whether it was satire, in the same vein as Jonathan 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, a way to talk about the contemporary world 
that surrounded them. Some saw in its descriptions of London the 
wartime city they themselves had known only a few years before.7 
Reviewers who found themselves on the side of the political spec-
trum Orwell opposed saw something else altogether: rather than a 
critique of totalitarianism, they saw a defense of capitalism, leading 
one Communist reviewer to say the book “coincides perfectly with 
the propaganda of the National Association of Manufacturers.”8
In the first decade or two after Nineteen Eighty-Four was published, 
a wide range of critics engaged with Orwell and his work. According 
to Simon During, “Lionel Trilling, Q. D. Leavis, Richard Hoggart, 
6 During, “More Orwell.”
7 See, for instance, the reviews collected in Howe, Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
291–97.
8 Samuel Sillen, “Maggot-of-the-Month,” 299.
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
52 The Art of Communication in a Polarized World
Richard Rorty, and even (with reservations) the young Raymond 
Williams, praised him.” But Orwell has been “neglected,” During 
writes, since the 1970s.9 The aspects of his work that have continued 
to attract interest relate to language and good writing. Composition 
and rhetoric scholars, not to mention scholars of political communi-
cation, have focused in particular on the idea of “doublespeak,” an 
invented word made by combining two other invented words, New-
speak and doublethink, which they use to mean 
language which makes the bad seem good, something negative 
appear positive, something unpleasant appear attractive, or at 
least tolerable. It is language which avoids or shifts responsib-
ility; language which is at variance with its real and purposed 
meaning; language which conceals or prevents thought.10
Others note that Orwell’s philosophy of language, as described in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four and “Politics and the English Language,” is 
divided between a laudable search for plain-spoken clarity and a 
nostalgia for the past, “a conservatism that sometimes comes close 
to sentimentality.”11 (It’s not clear whether the clarity Orwell sought 
ever existed or could exist, even within the bounds he himself tries 
to establish.)
“The Principles of Newspeak” as Translation Manual
If this is how people have interpreted Nineteen Eighty-Four, how do 
we generate a parallax view to see the same book from a new angle, 
one that places its parts in a different relation to each other? We 
9 During, “More Orwell.”
10 William Lutz, “Notes Toward a Definition of Doublespeak,” 4. The rest of Beyond 
Nineteen Eighty-Four—a volume that Lutz edited and from which his essay comes—
explores similar themes. Note that the word doublespeak does not appear in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four.
11 Walker Gibson, “Truisms Are True: Orwell’s View of Language,” 13.
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focus on the appendix, “The Principles of Newspeak,” rather than 
on the novel itself. 
It’s tacked onto the end of the novel, which mentions it only in 
passing with a note early in the first chapter that says, “Newspeak 
was the official language of Oceania. For an account of its structure 
and etymology, see Appendix” (5). It seems peripheral in that the 
story the novel tells is complete without it. But readers familiar with 
translation studies, if they look closely, will see in the appendix a 
description of different modes of translation, much like more con-
ventional works of scholarship.12 If we focus our attention there, the 
story becomes an illustration of a philosophy of translation put into 
practice.13
Newspeak, as the appendix explains, “was the official language of 
Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, 
or English Socialism,” and its purpose was “not only to provide a 
medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper 
to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought 
impossible” (198). It had identifiable means, goals, and effects. It 
functioned by substituting one word for many (means) as a way to 
restrict thought (goals) and cut people off from old ways of speaking 
and thinking (effects). The Party even employed a cadre of translators 
“engaged in producing garbled versions—definitive texts, they were 
called—of poems [and other texts] which had become ideologically 
offensive but which for one reason or another were to be retained in 
the anthologies” (29–30). Thus to see the appendix as a translation 
manual is not terribly farfetched.
The words devised for Newspeak (and thus the translation 
tools available to members of the Party) were divided into three 
12  For instance, Antoine Berman, “Translation and the Trials of the Foreign.”
13 Some of the few people to start with “The Principles of Newspeak” as a lens through 
which to interpret Nineteen Eighty-Four are the writers and producers of a 2017 stage 
adaptation. They observe that the appendix is “a really radical gesture against the rest 
of the book. It’s a book about how you can’t trust the written word.” Quoted in Jen-
nifer Shuessler, “With ‘1984’ on Broadway, Thoughtcrime Hits the Big Time.”
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categories or vocabularies. The first, the A vocabulary, consisted 
of “the words needed for the business of everyday life,” gener-
ally those “involving concrete objects or physical actions” related 
to eating, working, getting around, and so on (199). The second, 
the B vocabulary, consisted of compound words “which had been 
deliberately constructed for political purposes” (200). This cat-
egory included the words most closely associated with Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, such as Newspeak, doublethink, thoughtcrime, and so 
on. Finally, the C vocabulary included “scientific and technical 
terms” (203), although not in the sense we might recognize today. 
Like the words in the B vocabulary, they were ideological: they 
“were constructed from the same roots [as the scientific terms we 
know now], but the usual care was taken to define them rigidly 
and strip them of undesirable meanings” (203). Technicians had 
access to the words they needed to do their work, but they had 
little knowledge of other branches of what we would recognize as 
science. In fact, science as a form of inquiry into the external world 
was simply inconceivable: “There was, indeed, no word for ‘Science,’ 
any meaning that it could possible bear being already sufficiently 
covered by the word Ingsoc” (203).
As one of the architects of the language (a character named Syme) 
explains to Winston, his job was not to create words but to destroy 
them:
It’s a beautiful thing, the destruction of words. Of course the great 
wastage is in the verbs and adjectives, but there are hundreds of 
nouns that can be got rid of as well. It isn’t only the synonyms; 
there are also the antonyms. After all, what justification is there 
for a word which is simply the opposite of some other word? A 
word contains its opposite in itself. Take “good,” for instance. If 
you have a word like “good,” what need is there for a word like 
“bad”? “Ungood” will do just as well—better, because it’s an exact 
opposite, which the other is not. Or again, if you want a stronger 
version of “good,” what sense is there in having a whole string of 
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vague useless words like “excellent” and “splendid” and all the rest 
of them? “Plusgood” covers the meaning, or “doubleplusgood” if 
you want something stronger still. (35–36)
The appendix spells out this logic even more explicitly (199–200). 
To negate a word, a speaker added the prefix un-. To emphasize it, a 
speaker added plus- or, for still more emphasis, doubleplus-. Speakers 
could combine prefixes (making doubleplusun- an emphatic negation), 
as well as add suffixes such as -wise, to turn words into adverbs, and 
-ful, to turn them into adjectives. Nouns could also be used as verbs. 
Combined with the restriction of meanings to ideologically correct 
ideas, this logic made it possible to substitute one word for many. 
Goodthink (meaning “orthodox,” “orthodoxy,” “thinking in an ortho-
dox way,” etc.) and its derivatives (ungoodthink, etc.), could take the 
place of the class of words related to emotions (figure 14), which 
were politically dangerous in so far as they were unruly and hard to 
control (200–203).
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The Goals and Effects of Translation into Newspeak
The goal of Newspeak was to make ideas unthinkable by depriving 
people of the words they needed to think them. Newspeak’s architects 
(as dreamt up by Orwell) observed that without language, people 
would experience the world around them as a meaningless flux, a 
jumble of impressions and sensations. Language imposed order by 
imposing meaning. Words carved the world up into discrete units.
Anyone who has learned a second language will grasp this idea 
intuitively: sometimes there’s a word in your new language that 
simply doesn’t translate back into your old. The units carved out by 
your new language are too different. An internet search for “words 
that don’t translate to English,” for instance, yields lists that tell you 
things like dépaysement is French for “the disorientation felt in a 
foreign country or culture, the sense of being a fish out of water.”14
The linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf developed 
this hypothesis—that language structures how we see the world—in 
the 1920s and 30s.15 Sapir, for instance, wrote,
It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essen-
tially without the use of language and that language is merely an 
incidental means of solving specific problems of communication 
or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to 
a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of 
the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be 
considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in 
which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the 
same world with different labels attached.16
Whorf went still further:
14 Dan Dalton, “14 Perfect French Words and Phrases We Need in English.”
15 Whorf was Sapir’s student. Although Sapir’s influence on Whorf is clear, they 
did not in fact write any articles together, and much of what people recognize as the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is an extrapolation from their respective publications.
16 Edward Sapir, “The Status of Linguistics as a Science,” 209.
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Language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing 
ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and 
guide for the individual’s mental activity, for [her or] his analysis 
of impressions, for [her or] his synthesis of [her or] his mental 
stock in trade.17
If we take this assertion as a strong hypothesis, the implications 
are clear: to control how people think, it is enough to cut them off 
from their accustomed ways of speaking. (We can also take the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in a weak form, too, where we identify excep-
tions and counterexamples. We will return to the weak form later in 
this chapter.) The architects of Newspeak wanted to make speaking a 
reflex, like when a doctor taps your knee and your leg jerks forward: 
“Ultimately,” Orwell writes, “it was hoped to make articulate speech 
issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centers at 
all. This aim was frankly admitted in the Newspeak word duckspeak, 
meaning ‘to quack like a duck’” (203).
In short, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Newspeak is effective because it 
cuts people off from their history and deprives them of their ability 
to make sense of the world themselves. Think back to the discussion 
of interpretants in chapter 1. People hear a word, and it makes them 
think of an idea, which reminds them of another, which reminds 
them of still another, and so on. Newspeak cuts people off from those 
interpretants. It substitutes the interpretants the Party wants, or, if 
somehow speakers achieve the “ideal”—such as it is—of duckspeak, 
it eliminates interpretants altogether (figure 15). In other words, 
Newspeak, along with the violence inflicted on people who rebel, 
helps create the conditions for a form of collective solipsism. If people 
can’t trust their interpretations of the world or their recollection 
of history (on which they might base interpretations of the world), 
then the Party can interpret the world for them. O’Brien makes this 
state of affairs clear in a long exchange with Winston as he tortures 
17 Benjamin Lee Whorf, “Science and Linguistics,” [6]. See also Lutz, “Notes Toward 
a Definition of Doublespeak,” 2.
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him. Winston says that the world is older than the Party, and O’Brien 
tells him to prove it. Winston can’t because he has no independently 
verifiable evidence. O’Brien (not to mention the Party he represents) 
claims that whatever Winston remembers, he remembers it wrong. 
Even if he had physical evidence, O’Brien would claim it was phony, a 
claim Winston could not refute. (If he tried to refute it, what evidence 
would he have?) As O’Brien says,
We control matter because we control the mind. Reality is inside 
the skull. You will learn by degrees, Winston. There is nothing 
that we could not do. Invisibility, levitation—anything. I could 
float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wished to. I do not wish 
to, because the Party does not wish it. (176)
Through torture, O’Brien deprives Winston of any grounds on which 
he might stake a contradictory claim, just as the Party, through its 
institutionalized violence and surveillance, does to the people of Oce-
ania. Through Newspeak, the Party deprives them of the very tools 
they would need to imagine that there might be a different way to 
know the world. Violence and language work together as comple-
mentary means of control.
Figure 15. A speaker of Newspeak succumbs to collective solipsism as 




At this point, it would appear that cultural translation can be 
short-circuited. Its potential comes from the gap between what 
one person says and another person hears and understands, a gap 
brought about by the play of interpretants. If language and violence 
can cut people off from those interpretants, the potential for change 
will go unrealized.
In other words, we’re 180 degrees away from where we were at 
the end of chapter 1. To find our path back, it is necessary to look 
more closely at the philosophy (or more precisely, the epistemological 
stance) of solipsism, whose name derives from the Latin words solus, 
meaning “alone,” and ipse, meaning “self.” As O’Brien tortures Win-
ston, Winston wants to object to the “belief that nothing exists 
outside your own mind” (177). He searches for the name of this idea, 
which O’Brien gives him: “The word you are trying to think of is 
solipsism. But you are mistaken. This is not solipsism. Collective sol-
ipsism, if you like. But that is a different thing; in fact, the opposite 
thing” (177).
What exactly is this idea? Think of the movie The Matrix.18 In the 
beginning, the hero, a computer programmer named Neo, is living 
a normal life, although he is puzzled by things that keep repeating 
themselves. He is contacted by a man named Morpheus, who offers 
him a choice. If Neo wants to understand the anomalies, he can 
swallow a red pill, although Morpheus warns him that if he does, 
18 Lana Wachowski and Lilly Wachowski, dirs., The Matrix (1999). The conceit 
that makes The Matrix work, namely, that computers can create worlds that seem 
self-sufficient to the people inside their programs, is common in popular culture, 
revealing a range of different ways to think about solipsism. Fans of the 1990s 
program Star Trek: The Next Generation will recognize it in the episode “Ship in a 
Bottle,” where a self-aware holographic “person” believes he exits the holodeck when 
really his consciousness is uploaded to yet another program. Fans of the more recent 
series Black Mirror will recognize it in a number of episodes, including “San Juni-
pero,” where the hero uploads her consciousness to a computer-generated island 
paradise.
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he will face consequences he cannot yet grasp. If he wants to avoid 
those consequences, he can take a blue pill and return to his life. 
Neo takes the red pill, of course. (If he didn’t, there’d be no plot.) 
He is then dragged violently out of his world, and he awakes to find 
himself in a womb-like pod with electrodes plugged into his brain. 
Everything he has experienced up to that point was in the matrix, a 
computer-generated world that felt real because his mind treated it 
as real. Now he is in a much harsher world, which gives him the per-
spective to see that the matrix simply provided him with a powerful 
illusion.
The matrix was a solipsistic world, existing (for him) only in his 
mind. Neo was made to imagine it.19 It’s the idea of being made to 
imagine that O’Brien has in mind when he says collective solipsism 
is not the same thing as solipsism. Collective solipsism is imposed 
from the outside, and it’s more insidious because it causes people 
to doubt their senses and memory. How does the Party implement 
its strategies on a large scale? How does it create and control a col-
lective form of solipsism? It uses techniques such as gaslighting, or 
“psychologically manipulat[ing] a person into questioning their own 
sanity,” often by telling them that something they remember is not 
true.20 The Party has an entire apparatus to do just that, including 
the Ministry of Truth, where Winston works, which is devoted to 
changing “historical” records to match the narrative of the day. The 
people of Oceania trust the narrative they are given more than their 
own memories or perceptions, to the point where it comes to replace 
their memories. Early in the book, for instance, Winston hears that 
chocolate rations are being reduced from thirty grams to twenty. He 
19 Of course, how do we know that the “real” world Neo enters after he takes the 
red pill is any more real than the one he left behind?
20 American Dialect Society, quoted in Ben Yagoda, “How Old Is ‘Gaslighting’?” The 
term comes from a film called Gaslight released in 1944, which was based on a play 
produced in 1938. It is about a man who tries to undermine his wife’s confidence in 




is called upon as part of his job to rewrite documents that showed 
that the ration had ever been thirty grams. The rewriting is so suc-
cessful that a day later he hears that
there had even been demonstrations to thank Big Brother for 
raising the chocolate ration to twenty grams a week. And only 
yesterday, he reflected, it had been announced that the ration 
was to be reduced to twenty grams a week. Was it possible that 
they could swallow that, after only twenty-four hours? Yes, they 
swallowed it. (40)
More dramatically, at a climactic point in the story, Oceania’s war 
with Eurasia—its enemy up to that point—becomes an alliance, 
and its alliance with Eastasia turns into a war. Everyone is gathered 
for the public execution of Eurasian prisoners when, “at just this 
moment it had been announced that Oceania was not after all at war 
with Eurasia. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. Eurasia was an ally” 
(120). This statement contradicts everything people see around them. 
All the propaganda says the Eurasia is the enemy, but the Party’s 
gaslighting is so efficient that the only possible response is the idea 
that they have been tricked: “The banners and posters with which 
the square was decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had the 
wrong faces on them. It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein [a trai-
tor to the Party and ostensible leader of the Brotherhood resistance 
movement] had been at work!” (120).
In short, the Ministry of Truth treats history as a palimpsest, 
or a document (such as a medieval scroll) whose text is scraped off 
so the page can be used again. It constantly erases and rewrites the 
historical record, which has already been erased and rewritten often 
enough that the word historical is nonsensical. The record bears no 
relation to events that have actually happened, but in the Party’s 
gaslit collective solipsism, those events don’t matter. In fact, those 
events don’t exist. The only ones that matter are those that matter to 
the Party: “In no case would it have been possible, once the deed [of 
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fabricating the historical record] was done, to prove that any falsifi-
cation had taken place” (28).
Where does all of this—Newspeak, torture, solipsism, gaslighting, 
and the palimpsest of history—leave the question of translation? 
“The Principles of Newspeak” ends by quoting the first lines of the 
U.S. Declaration of Independence (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”). Then it explains,
It would have been quite impossible to render this into Newspeak 
while keeping to the sense of the original. The nearest one could 
come to doing so would be to swallow the whole passage up in the 
single word crimethink. A full translation could only be an ideo-
logical translation, whereby [Thomas] Jefferson’s words would be 
changed into a panegyric on absolute government. (205)
In other words, translation from Oldspeak (English as we speak it 
now) into Newspeak brings about a complete transformation of sense 
and reveals the limits of substituting one set of words for another 
when the words come from languages characterized by disjunctive 
worldviews.
The Lived Contradictions of Newspeak
This is the point where Orwell’s explicit reflection on language stops 
but where the novel itself goes further. It provides certain clues about 
Newspeak in actual use, which is far more complicated than the 
appendix might lead us to believe. Linguistic reduction might work 
hand-in-hand with historical amnesia, but its effectiveness is not 
absolute. Orwell offers an important caveat: Newspeak would render 
“heretical thought” unthinkable only “so far as thought is dependent 
on words” (198). This caveat hints at the fact that, in some instan-
ces, thought is not dependent on words. Here is where we revisit 
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the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in a weak form, one that allows for the 
possibility of thought outside of language: although language does 
impose a way to interpret the world, it is not ironclad. The example I 
gave of a word with no equivalent in English—dépaysement—helps us 
understand the room we have to manoeuvre. I used English—despite 
its lack of a word!—to explain the concept in ways that helped you 
understand it. If a strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis held 
true, we would not be able to think outside the structure imposed 
by our language at all.
So how do we do it? In Nineteen Eighty-Four, characters think 
outside the structures of Newspeak in at least three ways. First, 
they engage in doublethink (the ability to treat two contradictory 
thoughts as true at the same time). Second, and more interestingly, 
they react to nonverbal signs, such as smells or sounds in nature. 
Finally, they encounter complex signs (those that are more than 
simple words) multiple times, and the signs evoke different things 
each time. In other words, characters are reflexive about their own 
thoughts. They are not as cut off from their history as the book would 
lead us to believe.
Doublethink





At first glance, these translations (which is what they are, as peace 
replaces war, slavery replaces freedom, and strength replaces ignorance) 
seem nonsensical. How could war be its opposite? Or freedom or 
ignorance? What they reveal, in fact, is that Newspeak is grounded in 
a contradiction, that of doublethink, or the act of knowing and forget-
ting at the same time (but also forgetting what you needed to forget, 
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and then forgetting the act of forgetting). “Even to understand the 
word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink” because people 
had to forget they were doing it (25). This act is the contradiction that 
makes Newspeak possible: doublethink involves having thoughts 
that Newspeak would stamp out, but without doublethink, New-
speak could not exist.
What makes the aphorisms examples of doublethink? War is 
peace because Oceania’s perpetual state of war with its neighbours 
allows the Party to maintain order, if not peace, within its borders. 
Freedom is slavery because, as O’Brien explains, “power is collective. 
The individual only has power in so far as he ceases to be an individ-
ual” (175), which is to say, in so far as he submits himself to slavery. 
Ignorance is strength because the Party remains strong so long as 
its individual members are kept in a state of ignorant servitude.21 
In a feat of acrobatic dialectical thinking, people have to forget that 
war is war, freedom is freedom, and ignorance is ignorance. But the 
negated term in the dialectic remains in latent form. If it disappeared 
completely, there would be no need for either the Ministry of Truth 
(which labours to impose the Party’s ideological apparatus) or the 
Ministry of Love (which serves as its repressive apparatus).
Nonverbal Signs
Other signs reveal something different about the caveat about 
language. They are nonverbal—sounds, sights, smells, or other sen-
sations that evoke something for characters, even if the characters 
struggle to name what it is. The taste of real chocolate, rather than 
the “dull-brown crumbly stuff that tasted . . . like the smoke of a 
rubbish fire,” stirs up for Winston “some memory which he could not 
pin down, but which was powerful and troubling” (81). Later, when 
21 Much of this philosophy is laid out in The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collec-
tivism, a book-within-a-book signed by Emmanuel Goldstein, the figurehead of the 
Brotherhood resistance movement. (O’Brien reveals when he tortures Winston that 
he is actually the author.) See 122–33.
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he is awaiting his torturers, hunger evokes visceral notions of pain 
or panic, depending on how intensely he experiences it (152).
What makes these signs dangerous to the Party is their unruliness: 
the interpretants they evoke are visceral, and language is inadequate 
to describe them. They risk escaping the Party’s control. Consider 
the moment when Winston and Julia first meet, beyond the reach of 
the Party’s surveillance (or so they believe). They are in a field with 
bushes and trees, and they hear a thrush who seems to sing for the 
pure joy of it: “The music went on and on, minute after minute, with 
astonishing variations, never once repeating itself, almost as though 
the bird were deliberately showing off its virtuosity” (82). Winston 
gives himself over to the performance: “by degrees the flood of music 
drove all speculations out of his mind. It was as though it were a kind 
of liquid stuff that poured all over him and got mixed up with the 
sunlight that filtered through the leaves. He stopped thinking and 
merely felt” (82). Later, the last time he and Julia are together before 
the Thought Police move in to arrest them, they revisit the scene:
“Do you remember,” he said, “the thrush that sang to us, that 
first day, at the edge of the wood?”
“He wasn’t singing to us,” said Julia. “He was singing to please 
himself. Not even that. He was just singing.”
The birds sang, the proles sang, the Party did not sing. . . . 
Everywhere stood the same solid unconquerable figure [a prole 
woman Winston has seen before], made monstrous by work and 
childbearing, toiling from birth to death and still singing. Out 
of those mighty loins a race of conscious beings must one day 
come. You were the dead; theirs was the future. But you could 
share in that future if you kept alive the mind as they kept alive 
the body, and passed on the secret doctrine that two plus two 
make four. (147)
Julia insists the bird’s song was without meaning. Winston finds 
meaning there nonetheless: it reminds him of the prole woman he 
has heard singing, and the singing itself signifies something like 
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freedom (figure 16). Hence the fear the Party has of these signs, which 
is apparent in its attempts to stamp them out. “The terrible thing that 
the Party had done was to persuade you that mere impulses, mere 
feelings, were of no account, while at the same time robbing you of 
all power over the material world” (110). The Party can never take this 
persuasion for granted. It constantly has to resort to brute force to 
try to overcome the power of these signs. The amount of force it uses 
is in direct proportion to the power of these signs.
Figure 16. When Winston hears the thrush singing, he thinks 
of freedom. Image of bird adapted from Smit (1869, “Cichlopsis 
Leucogonys”). Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Signs That Evoke History
A third set of signs reveals in yet another way the limits of the Party’s 
control over thought. In contrast to the nonverbal signs, which 
tended toward the simple and unmediated, these signs are complex. 
They share an important trait: Winston encounters them twice over 
the course of the book, and their meaning changes because of the 
repetition.
What makes these examples interesting is that it is O’Brien (and 




use and the next. He presents them to Winston as a way to bring him 
into the Party’s solipsistic world. The first time Winston encounters 
each of these signs, they evoke ideas of freedom; the second time, 
frustration and hopelessness, as O’Brien turns the idea of freedom 
against itself. In the first example, Winston is at the Ministry of 
Truth when he comes across half a page of newsprint with a photo 
of men named Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford. The Party’s official 
history records them as traitors. They confessed to their crimes and 
were executed. But the photo makes it clear that they were some-
where else when their supposed crimes took place. It is historical 
evidence that proves they were forced to lie. Such evidence, Winston 
realizes, is “enough to blow the Party to atoms” (53). 
Later, Winston sees the photo again. O’Brien shows it to him 
briefly and then withdraws it from his sight.
“It exists!” [Winston] cried.
“No,” said O’Brien.
He stepped across the room. There was a memory hole [where 
people put paper to be incinerated] in the opposite wall. O’Brien 
lifted the grating. Unseen, the frail slip of paper was whirling 
away on the current of warm air; it was vanishing in a flash of 
flame. O’Brien turned away from the wall.
“Ashes,” he said. “Not even identifiable ashes. Dust. It does 
not exist. It never existed.”
“But it did exist! It does exist! It exists in memory. I remem-
ber it. You remember it.”
“I do not remember it,” said O’Brien. (164)
Winston recognizes O’Brien’s reaction as doublethink. The photo that 
once meant hope now meant “deadly helplessness” (164).
The second sign is an entire conversation Winston and Julia have 
with O’Brien when he has tricked them into believing he belongs to 
the resistance. O’Brien tells them they will receive orders they do 
not understand, and he wants to know what they are willing to do 
(figure 17). Will they commit “murder” or “acts of sabotage which may 
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cause the death of hundreds of innocent people”? Will they “betray 
[their] country to foreign powers”? Will they be willing “to cheat, to 
forge, to blackmail, to corrupt the minds of children, to distribute 
habit-forming drugs, to encourage prostitution, to disseminate ven-
ereal diseases,” or even “to throw sulphuric acid in a child’s face” if it 
would help weaken the Party? (114–15).
Figure 17. Winston tells O’Brien he will do terrible things to overcome 
Big Brother. Drawn by the author.
Yes, they answer. Their assent, as they see it and as O’Brien 
explains it, evokes a hope without hope, the idea that the future 
will be better, even if they will not know it. “There is no possibility 
that any perceptible change will happen within our own lifetime,” 
O’Brien says. “We are the dead.22 Our only true life is in the future” 
(117). Later, when O’Brien is torturing Winston, he plays a recording 
22 This is the same phrase—“We are the dead”—that Winston uses when he thinks 
about how the proles (whom he has seen singing) might overcome the Party. Right 
before the Thought Police raid their room, Winston and Julia repeat the phrase 
again. It loses its messianic overtones and becomes quite literal when the Thought 
Police confirm in response, “You are the dead” (147).
Will you commit murder?
Yes.




of this conversation: right after Winston accuses the Party of cruelty, 
O’Brien makes him listen to the terrible things he said he would do. A 
conversation that evoked notions of sacrifice in the name of freedom 
now evokes duplicity and moral depravity (figure 18).
Figure 18. The conversation between Winston and O’Brien takes on a 
new meaning for Winston. Drawn by the author.
What do we learn from this example? The conversation itself does 
not change. Its second iteration is a recording, after all. O’Brien uses 
the repetition to attribute new meaning to it and break Winston’s 
will. But there is something nonetheless redeeming about these 
examples, for they demonstrate that even the Party cannot change 
the fact that to use a sign is to transform it, and through that trans-
formation, to translate it.
Conclusion: Cultural Translation Between Utopia and Dystopia
Chapter 1 presented a utopian vision of cultural translation: we can 
exploit the gap between signs to open up space for people who have 
been socially or politically excluded. This chapter presents the other 
side of the coin: we can also exploit this gap to close off space (the 
Will you commit murder?
Yes.
Will you throw acid at children?
Yes.
Will you commit murder?
Yes.
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Party told people whom to hate) and impose our will upon others 
through real and symbolic violence.
In this respect, Nineteen Eighty-Four, although fiction, provides 
a valuable lesson for the worlds we walk through every day. What 
should we make of the fact that people can see in it their current 
political situation? If anything, the book and the tension it illustrates 
(between things that can be controlled through violence and things 
that can’t) help clarify the relationship between hope and work. Cul-
tural translation has the potential to bring more openness to the 
world, but we must not let optimism overcome us. Similarly, cultural 
translation has the potential to allow for cruelty and injustice, but 
we must not let pessimism overcome us, either. Whatever effect is 
to be achieved, we must work to achieve it. We must actively engage 
with each other and with the systems of power that structure our 
relationships.
Hence the need for tactics to prompt others to see the world from 
a different perspective. Hence the question that grounds the next 
chapter: what tools do we have at our disposal to allow us to engage 
meaningfully with people with whom we do not see eye-to-eye?
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Translational Invention,  
Inventive Translation
The preceding chapters have taken a bird’s-eye view of cultural trans-
lation. Chapter 1 described the utopian dreams it inspires. Chapter 
2 described the dystopian nightmares. Where does that leave us?
This chapter looks at the nuts and bolts of cultural translation. 
What techniques do people use to change other people’s minds—to 
induce them to see the world through a parallax view? In that respect, 
it changes the scale of our analysis from macro to micro. Through 
this act of refocusing, we will see that both the utopian and dysto-
pian views are misleading if they overlook the contingent nature of 
cultural translation, which is not inherently good or bad. It is a tool, 
and its value depends on the use to which we put it.
Consider the point where the last chapter left off. The world of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four is hermetically sealed, turned in on itself in a 
form of (nearly) inescapable solipsism. It might remind us of our 
current political circumstances, but our world is not as bleak as Win-
ston Smith’s.1 Of course, we don’t live in some magical world where 
everyone gets along, either. Instead, we’re somewhere in between. 
1 I write this sentence with the idea that although my present as writer and your 
present as reader are not the same, something about your current political situation 
3
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Still, the worlds we live in are more closed than we think. They 
differ from Nineteen Eighty-Four in degree more than substance. 
What I mean is that we impose symbolic order on our experience in 
the form of explanations about what the world is and how it operates. 
We recognize certain phenomena as causes and others as effects, 
building a chain of events that lets us explain who we are and what 
we are doing. We create, both individually and in interaction with 
others, symbolic worlds that appear complete and self-sufficient.
These worlds lead us to a rather pedestrian form of solipsism (as I 
hinted at in the opening lines of the introductory chapter). We don’t 
hold hard and fast to the idea that nothing outside our mind exists, 
but, pragmatically speaking, we act as if that were the case. We strug-
gle to make sense of new ideas because they don’t follow the logic 
that appears to us to be common sense. We’re faced with a paradox 
that researchers in science education identified nearly four decades 
ago: “Whenever the learner encounters a new phenomenon, [she or] 
he must rely on [her or] his current concepts to organize [her or] his 
investigation.”2 In other words, we stack the epistemological deck: to 
understand something new, we have to use the conceptual tools we’ve 
already developed to investigate it. The effect is counterintuitive. 
New ideas leave our conceptual foundations untouched: rather than 
challenge our a priori assumptions, they strengthen them.
Another way to see this paradox is to recognize that the symbolic 
worlds we inhabit can always absorb evidence that, to an outside 
observer, appears to contradict our views. Consider one controver-
sial issue in our era of polarized politics—climate change. People on 
opposite sides of the spectrum arrive at different interpretations of 
major weather events, which fit into their narratives about politics 
and climate in ways that support the ideas they already have. In 2016, 
will remind you—as my current situation reminds me—of Nineteen Eighty-Four.
2 George J. Posner, Kenneth A. Strike, Peter W. Hewson, and William A. Gert-




for instance, a fire engulfed the town of Fort McMurray, Alberta, the 
centre of bitumen oil production in Canada. The year leading up to 
the fire had been dry, a fact that prompted some to think climate 
change was responsible for the conditions that made the fire possible. 
Others blamed cyclical weather patterns. But however obvious the 
role of climate change was to people who believed in it, they could 
make no argument that would change the minds of those who did 
not. Indeed, skeptics had a ready-made explanation for any “evidence” 
about climate change they might present: it was political theatre and 
victim-blaming, especially if they suggested that oil production con-
tributed to the dry weather.3 Not only could skeptics explain away 
evidence by attributing it to politics, but doing so seemed to confirm 
something they already knew (or thought they knew), namely that 
their opponents were crassly and shamelessly political (figure 19).4
Figure 19. Two people with competing frames for understanding the 
2016 Fort McMurray forest fires. Drawn by the author.
3 Martine Danielle Stevens, “Ultradeep: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Fort 
McMurray and the Fires of Climate Change.” As Stevens points out, of course, it 
is hard to draw a direct causal link between climate change and specific weather 
events. But what matters for this example is the way people perceived a link.
4 For other examples, see Kyle Conway, Little Mosque on the Prairie and the Para-













“Fires in Fort 
McMurray”
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But, of course, people do change their minds. We don’t dismiss 
every new idea: sometimes the external world intrudes into our 
internal solipsisms, and sometimes new ideas cause us to step 
back and examine how we understand things. Maybe they hit upon 
some inconsistency in our worldview—something we can’t explain 
but can’t necessarily put our finger on—or maybe they’re simply 
too provocative to ignore. People change their minds about global 
warming, for instance, when they see its effects as personal, rather 
than politically motivated. In series of surveys between 2011 and 
2015, more than 20 percent of respondents who had changed their 
mind about global warming said they did so because they had per-
sonally experienced the impact of climate change.5 A New York Times 
article from 2018 described how a handful of people saw past their 
skepticism: a meteorologist spoke directly with scientists, a coal 
miner saw the effects of his career on the environment around 
him, a community organizer in Miami saw the threat higher waters 
posed for her neighbourhood.6 In each case, people came to see the 
effects of climate change in light of their own experiences, where 
they made a different kind of sense. They found a different frame 
for making sense of the world, which caused them to interpret evi-
dence such as rising waters or increased average temperature in a 
new way (figure 20).
What pins can we use to prick our solipsistic bubbles? Poetry 
is one. It can bring about a “meditative state of mind” that “yields 
clarity” about “the way our voices sound when we dip below the deci-
bel level of politics.”7 Humour is another. Jokes work by saying two 
things at once. They have two meanings—one literal or denotative, 
the other ironic or connotative—that contradict each other. The 
5 Kathryn S. Deeg, Erik Lyon, Anthony Leiserowitz, Edward Maibach, John Kotcher 
and Jennifer Marlon. “Who Is Changing Their Mind About Global Warming and Why?”
6 Livia Albeck-Ripka, “How Six Americans Changed Their Minds About Global 
Warming.”
7 Tracy K. Smith, quoted in Ruth Franklin, “Tracy K. Smith, America’s Poet Laure-
ate, Is a Woman with a Mission.”
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contradiction makes us laugh and see the world differently, at least 
for the brief moment where we hold the two meanings together.8
Figure 20. A climate change skeptic comes to interpret climate change 
as a threat to her neighbourhood rather than a result of the natural 
weather cycle when she sees it through a personalized frame. Drawn 
by the author.
This chapter focuses on yet another pin—that of shock—used by a 
Russian artist named Petr Pavlenskii.9 He is known for performances, 
which he calls “actions,” that involve inflicting pain upon his body in 
protest against injustices perpetrated by the Russian government. 
This chapter examines his actions through the lens of rhetorical 
invention, which, drawing on Aristotle, I described in chapter 1 as the 
ability to generate arguments by identifying and using “the available 
means of persuasion” in any given situation (Rhetoric, I.2).10
8 Conway, Little Mosque on the Prairie and the Paradoxes of Cultural Translation.
9 The artist’s name is transliterated from the Cyrillic spelling, Пётр Павленский, a 
number of different ways. I have adopted the spelling used in Russia—Art Resist-
ance and the Conservative-Authoritarian Zeitgeist, edited by Lena Jonson and Andrei 
Erofeev, which is the source of the translation of the dialogue on which I focus at the 
end of the chapter.
10 All quotations in this chapter come from the translation of Rhetoric by W. Rhys 
Roberts, in the digital edition published by the MIT Internet Classics Archive. Cita-
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Invention, like many ideas in this book, has paradoxical qualities. 
On the one hand, any act of invention is contingent on context. On 
the other, at least as laid out by Aristotle, the tools of persuasion 
(of which invention is one), are formulaic, which is the opposite 
of contingent. After an overview of invention and the paradox it 
engenders, this chapter turns to Pavlenskii’s art. It describes the art 
world’s interpretations of his actions and then asks what happens 
if instead we look at them through the lens of rhetorical invention. 
Then it identifies ways his actions prompt viewers (not to mention 
his police interrogator) to see the world from a new angle. He uses 
two rhetorical tools: he implicates his viewers in his actions, and he 
compels them to see his actions in the context of a different inter-
pretive frame, replacing one, whether legal or psychological, with 
another from the world of symbols and art.
Aristotle and Rhetorical Invention
Aristotle was a list-maker who lived in the fourth century BCE and 
was a student of Plato’s. He wrote about biology, physics, language, 
art, and poetry, among other things, working systematically through 
categories of objects and ideas, cataloguing their relationships to 
one another.
In Rhetoric, he explores the nature of persuasion and 
speech-making. He makes a list of tools a speaker (or “orator” or 
“rhetor”) can learn to use to persuade different types of people in a 
variety of situations. He categorizes these tools as a function of how 
they relate to what speakers want to accomplish, how they craft their 
Note that invention is, as I wrote in the introductory chapter, one of those terms 
that might strike contemporary readers as odd: why this term and not another? Aris-
totle answers that question when he writes that there are two modes of persuasion, 
one that uses “such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the 
outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on,” the 
other that uses such things “as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles 
of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented” (I.2).
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appeals, and what their listeners expect, given their life experience. 
The first, and arguably the most powerful, of these tools is invention, 
a term that, for Aristotle, refers to the construction or generation of 
arguments. These tools require no specialized skills, only the desire 
to acquire them (I.2). Anyone studying Rhetoric, Aristotle says, can 
learn this system and become a persuasive speaker.
Aristotle begins by identifying three types of speeches, political, 
forensic, and ceremonial, based on what speakers want to accomplish. 
Sometimes an orator seeks to persuade others about the future (as in 
the making of laws, when legislators want to shape how people will 
behave), sometimes about the past (as in court, when judges want 
to know what an accused person has done), sometimes about the 
present (as in situations meant to honour someone, when a rhetor 
uses a speech about a person to talk about the current situation more 
broadly) (I.3). Similarly, he identifies three modes of persuasion. 
Speakers are persuasive when they appear trustworthy (an appeal 
to ethos), when they influence how listeners feel (pathos), and when 
they present cogent, evidence-based arguments (logos). These tools 
all work in tandem. Appeals to emotion are made all the stronger 
when they come from someone who appears trustworthy, just as they 
are stronger when they accompany appeals to reason.
He breaks each of these modes down further. With respect to 
character or ethos he says, “It adds much to an orator’s influence that 
his own character should look right and that he should be thought 
to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers” (II.1). In other 
words, speakers are persuasive when they appear trustworthy and 
authoritative. They control their vocal tone, physical gestures, and 
other aspects of delivery to appear prudent and virtuous. (Think of 
someone about whom you might say, “That person has real pres-
ence.” They walk into a room and command attention by virtue of the 
way they carry themselves and address their listeners. Those actions 
that contribute to that person’s presence, so to speak, constitute the 
appeal to ethos.)
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Aristotle is also concerned with the character of the listeners 
(which is his way of talking about what they find persuasive): as 
much as speakers should “entertain the right feelings” toward their 
listeners, they should also work to put their listeners “in just the right 
frame of mind” toward them (II.1). They can learn techniques to this 
end, based for instance on the age and wealth of the listeners, along 
with their station in life. Aristotle thinks speakers should appeal to 
a man’s desire and frame their appeals to address the roots of that 
desire.11 Young men, he says, are hot-headed and love honour and 
victory because they want to feel superior. Speakers can appeal to 
them by linking what they want them to think or do to the honour 
they might achieve if they do it (II.12). Conversely, old men, having 
been tricked and cheated many times, act carefully, and they want 
only what they need to keep on living, rather than honour or victory. 
Speakers can persuade them by appealing to their sense of prudence 
(II.13). To be fair, two millennia later, we might take issue with Aris-
totle’s essentialism, but his insight into the relationship between 
desire and persuasion is valuable nonetheless.
With respect to emotion or pathos, he speaks of influencing “those 
feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that 
are also attended by pain or pleasure” (II.1). Emotions act on people 
in different ways and can thus be put to different use. Anger, which 
Aristotle defines as a desire for revenge in the face of injustice, is 
effective for persuading judges to convict someone accused of a crime 
(II.2). Fear, which he defines as pain in the face of imminent danger, 
is effective for persuading people to act in a way that promises them 
safety (II.5).
With respect to reason or logos, Aristotle describes two types of 
appeal: examples (a form of induction) and enthymemes (a form of 
deduction). Rhetorical examples are a type of comparison where, 
to persuade listeners about a given situation, speakers compare 
it to one that is already familiar, in hopes that listeners draw the 
11 Aristotle envisions listeners as men.
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same conclusion about the new situation as they would about the 
old.12 Enthymemes are a type of syllogism, or a logical statements 
made up of two parts, namely a major premise (such as a categorical 
statement: “All people are mortal”) and a minor premise (such as a 
statement of contingent fact: “You are a person”) that, when both are 
true, allow us to arrive at a conclusion (the implications of the major 
and minor premises: “You are mortal”). What makes an enthymeme 
different from a typical syllogism is that the speaker doesn’t state 
all the propositions: “For if any of these propositions is a familiar 
fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself” 
(I.2). The speaker lets the listener fill in the gaps. (If I say “you are a 
person and therefore mortal,” I do not need to include the premise 
that all people are mortal. You would arrive at my intended conclu-
sion because you already know people are mortal.)
This overview is necessarily brief. Rhetorical invention encom-
passes a wide range of strategies and tools to address an equally 
wide range of situations. Aristotle provides many more tools, such 
as a catalogue of propositions “about greatness or smallness and the 
greater or the lesser—propositions both universal and particular 
[that make it possible] to say which is the greater or lesser good, 
the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on” (I.3). He 
also catalogues common arguments in his work called Topics and 
explores emotion in On the Art of Poetry, his treatise on poetics. And 
he is not the only person to study invention. It held philosophers’ 
and scholars’ interest before Aristotle (whose Rhetoric was in part a 
response to Plato) and after (Cicero explores it in On Invention), and 
it continues to hold their interest now. 
12 Sometimes when my kids are arguing over something they both want, I say 
to them, “Remember the last time you couldn’t share? What happened then? You 
got in a fight and both had to spend time in your rooms. You know what’s going to 
happen if you keep up the argument you’re just starting now?” That’s an example in 
Aristotle’s sense. I’m comparing their current argument to one they’ve already had 
in hopes that their memory of the consequences then will persuade them to change 
their behaviour now. (Rarely does this happen.)
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In light of the idea’s rich history, what this chapter does is rather 
modest: it identifies and explores one inventional tool, cultural trans-
lation, to see its value in a specific type of circumstance. Our task is to 
see how invention becomes a pin with which to prick our solipsistic 
bubbles. The point is not to use translation to say something new 
about invention, but to use invention to say something new about 
translation. In other words, the idea of invention provides us a new 
view on the work of translation.
Like Aristotle, we need to identify the available means of persua-
sion. For that, we turn to Russian performance artist Petr Pavlenskii 
and consider both his art and what he says about it. Pavlenskii takes 
pains (literally and figuratively) to put members of his audience into 
“a right state of mind,” as Aristotle would say. His performances or 
“actions” evoke a strong visceral reaction, on which he builds an argu-
ment when he talks about them later in the media, in court, and in 
police interrogation. His central strategy—and the tool that is our 
focus—consists in leading a listener to interpret a contested idea in 
the context of a competing conceptual frame, as in the examples ear-
lier about global warming, where people came to see weather events 
through a personal frame. More simply, he helps people see things 
in a new way through a parallax view.
Now it is time to break his acts of invention down into their con-
stituent parts.
The Art of Petr Pavlenskii
Petr Pavlenskii is a Russian performance artist best known for 
inflicting pain on himself in protest against the abuses of the Rus-
sian government. In 2012, for instance, in an action called Seam 
(Шов), he sewed his lips together in front of the Kazan Cathedral 
in St. Petersburg to protest the trial of the punk band Pussy Riot, 
whose members had been arrested after a performance they staged 
in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. In 2013, in an action 
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called Carcass (Туша), he wrapped himself naked in barbed wire to 
protest laws restricting individual freedoms. Perhaps his best known 
action, Fixation (Фиксация), took place in 2013, when he nailed his 
scrotum to the paving stones in Moscow’s Red Square as “a meta-
phor of the apathy and political indifference and fatalism of the 
modern Russian society.”13 And in 2014, in an action called Segregation 
(Oтделение), he climbed up on a wall outside the Serbsky Centre, 
a psychiatric hospital in which political prisoners from the former 
Soviet Union disappeared, and cut off part of his earlobe (figure 21). 
Not all of his actions involve self-mutilation, however. In 2014, in 
Freedom (Свобода), he set a barricade of tires on fire on the Malyi 
Konyushennyi Bridge in St. Petersburg to evoke anti-Russia protests 
in Kiev, and in 2015, in Threat (Угроза), he set the doors to the head-
quarters of Russia’s secret police (formerly the KGB) on fire.
Figure 21. Petr Pavlenskii performs Segregation, 2014. Photograph by 
Missoksana, CC-BY-SA 4.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
13 Pavlenskii, quoted in Craig Stewart Walker, “Madness, Dissidence and Transduc-
tion,” 694.
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Members of the art world have reacted to Pavlenskii in a variety 
of ways, but all take it as given that his actions are indeed art. Critics 
reacting to Fixation saw it as “the final argument that can be made 
in an ongoing dispute with the government,” as an expression of 
“the poetic language of performance to a highly effective political 
end,” or, in a different vein, as an act that was ultimately deriva-
tive of the “various forms [of self-mutilation] by members of the 
Wiener Aktionismus movement back in the 1960s.”14 They also placed 
him in the context of past artists, such as van Gogh (who famously 
cut off his ear), and prior artistic movements, such as the Russian 
Futurists (who rejected traditional notions of art as they explored 
the machines of modern life in the 1910s) and the Viennese Action-
ists (who engaged in violent performance art in the 1960s), as noted 
above.15 They saw Pavlenskii’s immediate predecessors as the band 
Pussy Riot, not least because he held a sign referring to their incar-
ceration in his action Seam. (For his part, Pavlenskii has rejected most 
suggestions about his artistic lineage, citing only Chris Burden, an 
American artist who once had an assistant shoot him in the arm, as 
an inspiration.)16
Others interpreted Pavlenskii’s actions through different frames, 
or the “principles of organization which govern events—at least our 
social ones—and our subjective involvement in them,” to borrow a 
definition from Erving Goffman.17 Less abstractly, they give different 
answers to the question, “What is it that’s going on here?”18 Artists 
14 In order, Marat Guelman, David Thorp, and Anton Nossik, quoted in Ekow 
Eshun, Maryam Omidi, Jamie Rann, and Igor Zinatulin, “The Naked Truth: The Art 
World Reacts to Pyotr Pavlensky’s Red Square Protest.”
15 Per-Arne Bodin, “Petr Pevlenskii and His Actions,” 271–78; Amy Bryzgel, 
“Chopped Earlobes and the Long History of Political Shock Art in Russia”; Ingrid 
Nordgaard, “Documenting/Performing the Vulnerable Body: Pain and Agency in 
Works by Boris Mikhailov and Petr Pavlensky”; and Walker, “Madness, Dissidence 
and Transduction.”
16 Bodin, “Petr Pavlenskii and His Actions,” 272.




debated the newness of Pavlenskii’s work. Other people, especially 
members of the public or actors in Russia’s legal system, thought his 
self-mutilation could be only a symptom of mental illness. Others 
in the legal system saw his actions as vandalism or desecration of 
Russia’s patrimony, both of which were crimes (see table 1).
Table 1. Different frames used to explain Petr Pavlenskii’s actions
Frame Interpreter Interpretation
Artistic Critics Pavlenskii’s actions, 
whether original or 
derivative, are art.
Psychiatric Members of public
Actors in legal system
Self-mutilation is a 
symptom of mental illness, 
so Pavlenskii must be ill.
Legal Actors in legal system Pavlenskii’s actions 
constitute an act of 
vandalism or desecration 
and are crimes.
How can we understand the concept of frames in the theoretical 
terms set out in previous chapters? Charles Peirce, whose notion 
of “interpretant” grounds the analysis in chapter 1 and thus forms 
the foundation of this book, classifies a sign as a function of three 
conditions: what makes something a sign, how it relates to its ref-
erents (that is, what it’s a sign for), and what it reveals about them. 
He also classifies signs as a function of their complexity. The sim-
plest signs (“firsts”) are unmediated and unreflexive; more complex 
signs (“seconds”) are mediated, but not yet reflexive; the most 
complex signs (“thirds”) are both mediated and reflexive, and they 
derive from convention, habit, or law.19 The simplest signs are ones 
where the three conditions are all firsts, such as “a nebulous patch of 
color, seeing a blotch of red in an afterimage, hearing the wind blow 
19 Charles Peirce, The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings, 98–119.
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through an old house, the musty smell while walking in a forest, the 
aftertaste from a deliciously exotic meal.”20 The most complex are 
ones where the three conditions are all thirds: the “paradigm case 
is that of an inference of an argument, which shows the connection 
between one set of propositions (the premises) and another (the 
conclusion).”21 As a simple sign evokes an interpretant (which in turn 
evokes another and another and another), it becomes a building block 
for signs that are more complex. A nebulous patch of colour becomes 
the colour red, which people recognize in different contexts, and in 
certain contexts it takes on specific meanings: if people are driving 
and see a red octagon, for example, they know to stop.
Or, in the case of Pavlenskii, the feeling of resistance becomes an 
awareness of politics and history, and his actions come to evoke a 
series of propositions. Self-mutilation is a symptom of mental illness, 
and Pavlenskii mutilates himself, so he must be ill. Or vandalism is a 
crime, and Pavlenskii’s actions are a form of vandalism, so the police 
and courts are right to treat him as a criminal.
In this way, we can use the way signs grow in complexity to under-
stand the idea of a frame. When people see Pavlenskii’s actions, they 
have an initial reaction as to what those actions are—what it is that 
is going on here, to paraphrase Goffman. That initial reaction then 
shapes the chain of interpretants that leads to their conclusions about 
the meaning of his actions. It directs the movement from one inter-
pretant to another, so that someone watching or reading about an 
action arrives at one of many potential conclusions, to the exclusion 
of the others. That initial reaction—the first interpretant—becomes 
the frame.22 Pavlenskii replaces that first interpretant—the primary 
20 James Jakób Liszka, A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, 48.
21 Ibid., 52.
22 It is first in a conceptual sense, in that it is primary, rather than a strictly 
chronological sense, although in some circumstances it might be both. I’m taking 
liberties with Goffman here. He doesn’t necessarily see frames as something people 
actively shape, but I do. That idea comes more from media studies, where people like 
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frame—with another interpretant and changes not just the chain of 
associations but the final conclusions at which people arrive. In other 
words (there is that telling phrase again!), his strategy is to perform 
an act of cultural translation.
This idea of a frame-as-first-interpretant makes it possible to 
see Pavlenskii’s actions from a new angle, not just as art but also as 
rhetorical invention. Consider his response to the psychiatric frame. 
Many people see his actions and think he must have a mental illness. 
Their logic goes something like this: self-mutilation is so grotesque 
that is must be a symptom of mental illness (their major premise). 
Pavlenskii engages in self-mutilation (their minor premise). There-
fore he must be mentally ill (their conclusion) (figure 22).23
Figure 22. A psychiatric frame used to interpret Pavlenskii’s 
Segregation. Adapted from photograph by Missoksana, CC-BY-SA 4.0. 
Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Pavlenskii refutes this syllogism by challenging its major prem-
ise: people do the things he has done for other reasons, such as to 
criticize an oppressive government. He shows that his purpose is cri-
tique by engaging with the court system in strategic ways. He insists 
on being charged with the most serious crime, even when prosecu-
tors would prefer lesser charges, effectively forcing their hand. He 
puts them in the position of making arguments they don’t want to 
Robert Entman have used frames to talk about the choices journalists make when 
they draw attention to certain aspects of a story. See Robert M. Entman, “Framing: 
Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.”
23 Cf. Walker, “Madness, Dissidence and Transduction.”
self-mutilation
Self-mutilation 
is a symptom of 
mental illness.
Pavlenskii must 




86 The Art of Communication in a Polarized World
make, confronting them with a forced choice: either they support the 
system at the cost of their integrity, or they maintain their integrity 
and challenge an unjust system.24 This approach suggests a type of 
methodical thought that is not a symptom of mental illness. Thus 
Pavlenskii establishes a competing syllogism: self-mutilation can be 
something other than a symptom of mental illness (his major prem-
ise). He hurts himself, but for reasons related to art and protest (his 
minor premise). Therefore his actions are not a sign of mental illness 
(his conclusion) (figure 23).25
Figure 23. A political frame used to interpret Pavlenskii’s Segregation. 
Adapted from photograph by Missoksana, CC-BY-SA 4.0. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons.
Pavlenskii takes a similar approach to the legal frame. Police offi-
cers, lawyers, and judges tend to see his actions as crimes. Their logic 
follows these lines: people who destroy property that is not theirs 
commit acts of hooliganism, vandalism, or desecration and should 
be charged with a crime (their major premise). Pavlenskii has com-
mitted such acts, such as when he lit tires on fire on the bridge in 
24 Bodin, “Petr Pavlenskii and His Actions.”
25 Strictly speaking, the syllogisms here do not hold up to a rigorous logic. The major 
and minor premises of Pavlenskii’s syllogism, for instance, do not lead necessarily 
to the conclusion (mental illness does not stop people from being politically active, 
for instance). What matters discursively, however, is the conclusion he leads viewers 
to make (see, for example, Bodin, “Petr Pavlenskii and His Actions”). This idea is 
consistent with Aristotle’s account of logos, which depends on “the proof, or apparent 
proof, provided by the words of the speech itself” (Rhetoric, I.2, emphasis added).
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St. Petersburg (their minor premise). Therefore he should be charged 
with a crime (their conclusion) (figure 24). Not surprisingly, those 
charges have been the ones he has faced: hooliganism, a charge also 
brought against Pussy Riot for their protest in the Cathedral of Christ 
the Saviour, and vandalism or desecration, a charge applied when a 
person vandalizes cultural artefacts.26
Figure 24. A legal frame used to interpret Pavlenskii’s Freedom. 
Adapted from photograph by Mstyslav Chernov (Kiev, 18 February 
2014), CC-BY-SA 3.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Pavlenskii employs a similar strategy to challenge this frame as 
he does to challenge the psychiatric frame: he implicates his viewers, 
especially those in law enforcement, in his actions. He wants them to 
see they are cogs in a machine: “People in law enforcement agencies 
are forced to become tools,” he says; “everything human in them is 
suppressed. But many of them doubt that what they are doing is 
right, so the human element can rebel against the functional one.”27 
He establishes a different syllogism: the legal system turns people 
26 Walker, “Madness, Dissidence and Transduction,” 691; and Bodin, “Petr Pev-
lenskii and His Actions,” 277. The term desecration reveals another dimension of 
the legal frame, namely, its relation to the religious sphere. In some cases, the link 
is direct: Pussy Riot protested in a cathedral, and Pavlenskii’s action Seam, where 
he expressed support for Pussy Riot, took place in front of a different cathedral. 
Elsewhere it is indirect, as when art critics point out “the resemblance of his 
performances to the public behaviour of Russian fools for Christ, which included 
provocations directed at the powers that be, nakedness and extreme asceticism” 
(Bodin, “Petr Pevlenskii and His Actions,” 277).
27 Quoted in Ivan Nechepurenko, “How Russia’s ‘Most Controversial Artist’ Per-
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into cogs or tools (his major premise). Police officers enforce the law 
(his minor premise). Therefore they are tools, people who must sur-
render to the system (his conclusion). He also establishes a second 
syllogism, where the conclusion of the first is the minor premise: 
people who are tools in the system want to regain their humanity 
(major premise). Police officers are tools (minor premise). Therefore 
they want to regain their humanity (conclusion), which they can do, 
he suggests, by seeing his actions as art, rather than hooliganism or 
vandalism (figure 25).
Figure 25. A political frame used to interpret Pavlenskii’s Freedom. 
Adapted from the photograph by Mstyslav Chernov (Kiev, 18 February 
2014), CC-BY-SA 3.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
Freedom and “A Dialogue about Art”
We have seen how Pavlenskii replaces one frame with another at 
the level of his art in society. But what about at an interpersonal 
level? What are the strategies he uses in conversation to prompt 
someone to see the world from a new perspective? After Freedom in 
2014, when he set fire to a pile of tires on a bridge in St. Petersburg, 
he was arrested and interrogated. Unbeknownst to his interroga-
tor, Pavel Yasman, he recorded the interrogation. He later published 
a transcript on the website Snob.ru.28 An English translation was 
28 Lena De Winne, “Допрос Петра Павленского. Пьеса в трех действиях [The 
Interrogation of Petr Pavlenskii: A Play in Three Acts].”
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published in 2017.29 The interrogation, which took place in three ses-
sions, was published in the form of a dialogue between Pavlenskii and 
Yasman, and it reveals the artist’s rhetorical strategies. Remarkably, 
when the interrogation was done, Yasman quit his job to become a 
human-rights lawyer, having been persuaded by Pavlenskii to exam-
ine his life more closely.30
Throughout the interrogation, Pavlenskii and Yasman argue from 
within identifiable, incompatible frames—Yasman’s legal, Pavlen-
skii’s symbolic. At various points, they both try to argue from within 
the frame of the other. Pavlenskii finally prevails by showing Yasman 
where the contradictions lie within the legal frame and how Yasman 
perpetuates those contradictions, which ultimately are contrary to 
his own personal convictions.
Yasman’s main strategy is to focus the discussion as narrowly as 
possible. He does not want to consider context: he wants to talk 
about specific acts, namely those related to the fire. He constantly 
chides Pavlenskii “not [to] think so globally in such matters” (284). 
His logic follows these lines. His major premise is that “we have laws 
and a legislature that describes specific actions for which a person 
is legally responsible” (281). His minor premise is that Pavlenskii 
committed one of these acts by lighting the tires on fire: “It does 
not matter whether it is art or not art” (282). His conclusion is that 
Pavlenskii is legally responsible and must suffer the consequences.
In several places, Yasman tries to argue from within Pavlenskii’s 
symbolic frame. He offers examples of art (as he imagines it) where 
the actions that matter are clearly crimes. “But you might just go 
and murder someone for the sake of art” (279). Or “let’s say that 
some people go to the grave of an African-American, [and they] 
break the tombstone, smash it, but play it in a theatrical way” (280). 
29 Petr Pavlenskii and Pavel Yasman, “A Dialogue About Art.” For the sake of 
legibility, in this section I give the page numbers referring to this transcript in par-
enthetical in-text citations.
30 Nechepurenko, “How Russia’s ‘Most Controversial Artist’ Persuaded His Interro-
gator to Change Sides.”
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Pavlenskii responds by showing either how these acts are unprin-
cipled and not art or how context matters: “It could be the friends of 
the African-American [who break the tombstone],” he says, “because 
their country’s ritual provides for some kind special treatment. As in 
Tibet, for example” (280).
Such responses derive from Pavlenskii’s symbolic frame. He 
adopts a broad view: “The act of art occurs in the symbolic field for 
the most part; and to a certain extent, of course, in reality. That is, 
we must begin to look at the action from different angles” (283). 
Symbolism and law, he argues, are largely incompatible. With respect 
to the specific charges of desecration he faces, he says:
I will try to talk about vandalism from a legal point of view. Like 
talking about desecration. What is desecration? A humiliation 
of something: piss, crap, smash, this can be seen as desecration, 
because some actions are well-established symbols of humiliation 
from the point of view of the amassed experience. But fire is not 
a symbol of humiliation. (286)
He establishes yet another syllogism: Desecration implies humilia-
tion (major premise). Or, to restate it, if there is no humiliation, there 
is no desecration. That, he maintains, is his case: the fire he set put 
no one at risk, did not harm the bridge, and evoked social struggles 
in support of freedom. “The bridge was not humiliated” (288) (minor 
premise). Therefore he committed no crime (conclusion).
Pavlenskii goes a step further by showing Yasman how Yasman 
has been instrumentalized within a dehumanizing system. At the 
beginning of the third session, he asks why Yasman has returned. 
Yasman answers, “I . . . got my ass handed to me because the case is 
still in court” (288). Yasman says he has to carry out his instructions. 
“So you admit that you are a tool,” Pavlenskii responds:
This instrumentalization, the power just instrumentalizes 
people. . . . [These systems] make you do what you do not want 
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to do. They take people who are initially able to recognize art, to 
make art. And then some people are forced to attack others. (288)
Pavlenskii is critiquing a system that makes people act against their 
will. Yasman recognizes himself within that system because he feels 
constrained in the way Pavlenskii describes. In effect, Pavlenskii 
has introduced a new syllogism. A dehumanizing system must be 
challenged (major premise). Yasman sees the Russian legal system 
as dehumanizing (minor premise). It no longer provides an explan-
ation of the world he finds convincing, and it must be challenged 
(conclusion). The last words of the interrogation are Yasman’s: “I’m 
going to leave the system sooner or later,” he admits. “I just don’t 
know how” (291).
Conclusion: What Invention Teaches Us About Translation
Throughout the interrogation, Pavlenskii’s appeals to reason are 
clear. Major premise, minor premise, conclusion. Major premise, 
minor premise, conclusion. He also works to put Yasman “in just the 
right frame of mind,” as Aristotle suggests (Rhetoric, II.1), by acting 
in such a way that his words are imbued with authority (although, of 
course, we have only a translated transcript to go by). He is unwaver-
ing in his insistence that Yasman consider the broader context, but 
he never says a rude word. When Yasman tries to provoke him, he 
responds with restraint, while Yasman often appears flustered. And 
Pavlenskii appeals to those “feelings that so change men as to affect 
their judgements” (II.1), specifically Yasman’s sense of frustration in 
the face of a dehumanizing system and his hope in light of the choices 
he can make to escape that system. In short, he is inventive in Aris-
totle’s sense: he has used identifiable tools to generate an argument 
tailored to a specific person and circumstance.
What does his approach reveal about translation—that is, the 
substitution of signs? Pavlenskii was successful when he changed 
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his interrogator’s initial interpretant—the first thing he thought of 
when he considered the tires Pavlenskii set on fire. When Yasman’s 
first thought was dehumanizing system rather than law-enforcement, 
the final conclusion at which he arrived was different. He changed 
his mind about Pavlenskii because Pavlenskii’s actions came to have 
a more personal meaning for him, much as the climate change skep-
tics in the introduction changed their mind when extreme weather 
events touched them personally. 
In this way, translation becomes a tool for invention. It’s at our 
disposal as one possible way to persuade the person we’re talking to. 
At the same time, the idea of invention—the ability to see and use 
the tools at hand—helps us see translation as strategic. Pavlenskii’s 
approach of implicating his viewers to prompt them to see his actions 
in a different frame is one such strategy. 
These strategies, of course, are not the only ones, nor is change 
of this type a foregone conclusion. At the macro, conceptual level, 
cultural translation had utopian and dystopian possibilities, as we 
saw in chapters 1 and 2. The same is true at the micro, strategic level, 
as this chapter has shown and the next chapter shows.
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Fake News and  
Perspective Unmoored
There’s a pattern to this book. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 all explore the same 
phenomenon, but on different scales and with different polarities 
(some look at positive examples, while some look at negative).
Chapter 1 argues that all communication is translation because 
words never mean exactly the same thing twice. That is, a word 
evokes something different for listeners from one use to the next, if 
only because when I use a word and you, in your response, use it too, 
you have to account not only for your use of the word, but also for 
mine (which I didn’t need to do). We can make use of this semiotic 
gap to perform acts of cultural translation and, if we’re strategic, help 
people see the world from a new perspective, making it a tool against 
the oppression of others. Chapter 2 presents the flip-side of chapter 
1. It is concerned with ways cultural translation can stop people from 
seeing the world from any perspective at all. People can exploit the 
gap between uses of a word to cut others off from their own inter-
pretation of the world, thus depriving them of the tools they need to 
make their own decisions. This is what O’Brien does to Winston in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Chapter 3 makes the same argument as chapter 
1, but on a micro-scale. It looks at tactics people can use to change 
4
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others’ minds by changing their initial interpretive frame. It high-
lights an approach taken by performance artist Petr Pavlenskii, who 
implicates the people he’s talking to in the argument he’s making. The 
shock people experience in recognizing themselves in his argument 
prompts them to see the world anew, as if through a parallax view: 
the objects they’re looking at don’t move, but they as observers do, 
causing them to see the objects in a new configuration.
Chapter 4, which is about fake news, follows this pattern. Like 
chapter 2, it is about perspective unmoored, in ways similar to what 
we saw in Nineteen Eighty-Four: after the election of Donald Trump 
as president of the United States in 2016, the idea of fake news in a 
“post-truth” society reminded so many people of Orwell’s book that 
it became a surprise best-seller.1 Like chapter 3, it is about tactics, in 
ways similar to what we saw in Pavlenskii’s art: the act of implicating 
people in an argument can cause them to reject new perspectives just 
as easily as adopt them.
Fake news is a complex topic, which this chapter explores by pla-
cing debates about it in two contexts: first, ideas of objectivity in 
journalism, philosophy, and science, and, second, past controversies 
about the status of facts in reporting. It then examines the tactics 
used by President Trump to tether the phrase fake news to a new set of 
ideas. The central question is this: how has the term fake news evolved? 
Its meaning—as previous chapters would lead us to expect—has not 
remained stable from one use to the next. In the years leading up to 
the 2016 election, it usually referred to fake news programs, such as 
those that aired on the U.S. cable network Comedy Central. Immedi-
ately after the election, journalists from broad-circulation outlets 
such as the New York Times talked about fake news as stories that were 
false. Trump (not to mention authoritarian leaders around the world) 
then co-opted the term, stripping it of its critical edge by applying it to 
1 Michiko Kakutani, “Why ‘1984’ Is a 2017 Must-Read.”
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stories he found troublesome.2 What’s striking about the shift is the 
degree to which Trump’s use of the term has caused a collective sense 
of crisis among journalists. What tactics has Trump used, and why 
did they generate this sense of crisis? In short, how did this change in 
meaning take place, and what made it stick?
What Is Objectivity?
Perhaps it goes without saying, but to function as informed citizens 
in a democracy, we need to know what’s going on in the world around 
us. We need to talk with others to identify problems and explore 
possible solutions. We need to argue, and ideally we do so with some 
belief in the notion that we can trust that what we think is true is 
in fact true. We want to be sure we’re making the right choices or 
advocating for the best course of action.3
But we can’t know the world merely as it is. We know it through 
our senses, first of all, which act as mediators between us and the 
things we experience. We have no independent way to verify that 
what our senses tell us is true—to do so, we’d have to gather informa-
tion about the world yet again through the mediation of our senses. 
In other words, we have no choice but to rely on our senses, which 
might deceive us.
There’s also a lot of world that we’ll never personally experience. 
I’ve lived quite a few places (in eleven cities in three countries on two 
continents), and I speak two languages. Many people have seen much 
more than I have. But none of us, not even the most experienced 
2 In a tweet from May 2018, Trump made the link between “fakeness” and negative 
coverage clear: “Just reported that, despite the tremendous success we are having 
with the economy & all things else, 91% of the Network News about me is negative 
(Fake).” Quoted in Tamara Keith, “President Trump’s Description of What’s ‘Fake’ Is 
Expanding.”
3 Or so I stubbornly believe. I became a teacher based on this stubborn belief. Call 
me naïve if you will, but this is a fight I refuse to give up.
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world-travellers, will ever see any more than a miniscule percentage 
of what’s out there. So we must rely on the accounts of others, many 
of whom we’ll meet only through TV or the internet. We must trust 
them if we are to have any confidence in what they show us.
Here is where the idea of objectivity comes into play. In a philo-
sophical sense, objectivity is the capacity to describe the world as it 
is, rather than how we perceive it to be. We achieve objectivity to the 
degree that we remove our own subjective perspective from the pro-
cess of observation. In other words, an observation is objective if it’s 
true regardless of who makes it. This task, of course, is paradoxical: 
we’re trying to use our senses to overcome the limits imposed by our 
senses, as they mediate our contact with the world.4
Journalists have a different (but related) sense of objectivity. 
For them, it’s a way to compensate for the perspective they bring to 
the events they describe. Journalists are constantly making choices 
about what makes an event newsworthy, or even what events con-
stitute “news” in the first place. They write about some aspects of 
an event but not others, decisions that come from their personal 
and professional experience, which is in turn shaped by a history of 
social and economic pressures shaping the news industry. Although 
we might take ideas of objectivity for granted now, it’s important to 
understand that they developed in specific places at specific times, 
namely the English-speaking world in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. They are not universally shared or applied, as journalists 
in different places and traditions have differing priorities and habits. 
In fact, we can understand the skepticism many people now express 
4 The philosophical approach that addresses this paradox head on is phenomenol-
ogy. It consists in asking how we experience the world, rather than what the world 
is. Edmund Husserl, for instance, takes as his object of investigation not the thing 
he perceives—a person standing in front of him, for instance—but instead his 
experience of perception itself. See Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. For a 
more contemporary account addressed to twenty-first century readers, see Samuel 
D. Rocha, Folk Phenomenology: Education, Study, and the Human Person.
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
 97Conway
about journalists’ motivations and the veracity of their reporting by 
taking a closer look at this history.
Sociologist Jean Chalaby describes the development of profes-
sional notions of objectivity as part of a shift that English-language 
journalism underwent between the 1830s and the 1920s.5 This shift 
came about because of reporters’ access to new technologies and their 
development of new journalistic techniques. In the first case, the 
telegraph made it possible for them to write about things happening 
too far away to see in person. No longer did communication involve 
the movement of people (they didn’t have to travel to where events 
took place) or of physical media such as written documents (they 
didn’t have to rely on trains or other modes of transport to deliver 
accounts of faraway events).6 In the second case, American journal-
ists began to organize their reports around “fact-centred discursive 
practices.”7 One of their new tools was the interview, which became 
common practice in the 1860s.8
The shift that led to contemporary notions of objectivity related 
most importantly to the way newspapers were funded. Before the 
1830s, newspapers were dependent on political parties and on the 
government for their funding. As printing technologies developed 
(for instance, with the introduction of steam-powered rotary 
presses in the mid-nineteenth century), the cost of production fell. 
Publishers could produce more copies and sell them for less. Their 
increased reach made them attractive to advertisers, who provided 
money to replace the revenue they had received from political parties. 
Advertisers wanted to reach the largest audience possible. In order 
not to alienate readers, reporters adopted a more politically neutral 
5 Jean Chalaby, “Journalism as an Anglo-American Invention: A Comparison of the 
Development of French and Anglo-American Journalism, 1830s–1920s.”
6 With respect to the role of the telegraph in changing how people related to space 
and distance, see James Carey, “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph.”
7 Chalaby, “Journalism as an Anglo-American Invention,” 310.
8 Ibid., 312.
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approach. This neutrality, borne of newspapers’ increasing economic 
autonomy, came to define how journalists understood their profes-
sional obligations. Objectivity came to mean “political neutrality.”9
The ways journalists put these ideas into practice were also 
shaped by social and economic factors. In the 1970s, sociologist 
Gaye Tuchman spent time in the northeastern United States among 
reporters going about their work. She observed that they treated 
objectivity as a way to mitigate risk. Specifically, they worried that 
they could be held legally accountable (through libel laws) if they 
wrote something false. To avoid that possibility, they adopted a set 
of professional practices meant to deflect accusations of bias. For 
instance, they presented conflicting explanations of events (that 
is, they covered “both” sides of a story). They also sought out and 
presented evidence that supported the assertions they made. When 
they wrote something controversial, they made “judicious” use of 
quotation marks (that is, they quoted someone making a contro-
versial statement, rather than making it themselves). Finally, they 
structured their information in a conventional sequence, with the 
most important facts first, then the explanations of those facts 
later.10 (This is the “inverted pyramid” approach, which grew out of 
the emphasis on facts Chalaby observed in the professional practi-
ces that developed in the nineteenth century.)
What this brief history reveals is one of the sources for people’s 
current skepticism about journalists and their intentions. If objec-
tivity in a philosophical sense is an illusion, and if objectivity in a 
journalistic sense is merely a practice, why shouldn’t we be skeptical 
about how journalists pursue their work? We as news consumers 
are savvy about the social and economic factors that shape what 
9 Ibid., 320. Of course, this reliance made a different type of influence possible: 
advertisers can also shape content, a fact that has become especially clear since the 
1990s, when cable news networks, with the support of their advertisers, carved out 
new audiences by catering to specific political views.




journalists do. Politics in North American and European democra-
cies have grown increasingly polarized, and it’s not hard to find bias 
against our point of view, whichever it is, in different outlets. No one 
will deny that the world depicted by Fox News is not the same as the 
one depicted by National Public Radio, the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, or the New York Times. So what’s to say that the stories 
journalists present are in any way true? 
Fake News: A Brief History
The multiplicity of different viewpoints to which people were exposed 
with the arrival of the internet, cable news, and social media, among 
other things, meant that habits journalists had long adopted under 
the label of objectivity no longer served to generate the trust they 
had in the 1970s. In other words, in the time leading up to and 
immediately following the 2016 U.S. election, Americans were ripe 
for the idea of fake news. They didn’t trust journalists. More than 
half thought that the news media were biased, regardless of their 
political affiliation. More than three-quarters of Republicans didn’t 
trust the media, conservative Republicans being the least likely of 
all to trust them. Democrats tended to trust them more, but not by 
much. The more they diverged from the centre, the less trustful they 
were (figure 26).11
If people distrusted the news media, they distrusted social 
media—where many false stories circulated—even more. Only 4 per-
cent of “web-using U.S. adults” said they trusted information they got 
from social media “a lot,” while another 30 percent said they trusted 
it “some.”12 This immense distrust translated into a situation where 
many people “[saw] fake news as different from poor journalism 
11 Amy Mitchell et al., The Modern News Consumer: News Attitudes and Practices in 
the Digital Era, 9.
12 Ibid., 7. See also Richard Fletcher and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, “People Don’t Trust 
News Media—and This Is Key to the Global Misinformation Debate,” 14–15.
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primarily by degree.”13 The habits journalists had long adopted under 
the label of objectivity no longer served to generate the trust they had 
in the 1970s.
Figure 26. Percentage of people who think media are biased, as a 
function of political orientation. Data collected from Mitchell et al., 
2016, The Modern News Consumer, 10.
Add to this the active efforts that professional internet trolls 
were making to spread disinformation, and the mix is potent. The 
Internet Research Agency, based in St. Petersburg, Russia, was the 
best-known organization, employing “hundreds of Russians to post 
pro-Kremlin propaganda online under fake identities, including on 
Twitter, in order to create the illusion of a massive army of support-
ers.” It has been responsible for “highly coordinated disinformation 
campaign[s], involving dozens of fake accounts that posted hundreds 
of tweets for hours, targeting [lists] of figures precisely chosen to 
generate maximum attention.”14 Its activities have been well covered 
13 Fletcher and Nielsen, “People Don’t Trust News Media,” 15.







































in the U.S. press, giving Americans even more reason to be skeptical 
about the news they read or see.
To be sure, the phenomenon of made-up stories is not new. Michael 
Schudson and Barbie Zelizer cite examples as far back as “anti-Semitic 
blood libel stories in 15th century Europe to church-supported mis-
sives of divine retribution following the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake.”15 
They also quote Thomas Jefferson, who lamented in 1807 that “the 
man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he 
who reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to the 
truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods & errors.”16
The phrase fake news also shows up in greater and lesser frequency 
over the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as 
this n-gram shows (figure 27). (An n-gram measures how often a word 
or phrase appears in a given corpus, or collection of texts. In this case, 
the corpus is all the books digitized by Google.)17
Figure 27. N-gram representing the use of the phrase “fake news,” 
1900–2008. Data collected from Google Books Ngram Viewer.
15 Michael Schudson and Barbie Zelizer, “Fake News in Context,” 1.
16 Ibid.
17 Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of 
Digitized Books.”
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There are a number of peaks and valleys. One peak comes during 
the First World War, and another, steeper peak, during the Second 
World War. A third, subtler peak is observable in the 1960s and 1970s, 
during the Cold War. All three are indices of the concerns people in 
the English-speaking world had about propaganda (during the world 
wars) or Soviet dezinformatsiya (during the Cold War).18 
The last peak, beginning in about 2000, reflects a different 
concern. As the cable industry in the United States became more 
competitive, with an ever-increasing number of channels dividing 
viewers into ever-smaller groups, networks had to find ways to dis-
tinguish themselves from their competitors. One network, Comedy 
Central, did so by creating satirical news programs such as The Daily 
Show, which began to air in 1996. Jon Stewart became the host in 
1999, right before the contested presidential election of 2000, the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, and the tumultuous presidency of George W. 
Bush. With Stewart as host, The Daily Show attracted many view-
ers, especially from younger demographics that were less likely to 
watch conventional news. It also produced spin-off shows such as The 
Colbert Report, a parody of conservative talk shows. Scholars, journal-
ists, and other professional opinion-makers either worried about or 
celebrated the trend, especially as studies began to show that these 
programs could increase engagement among younger voters.19
Since the election of Donald Trump as president of the United 
States in 2016, interest in fake news—returning here to the older 
sense of “made up news”—has risen again. Figure 28 shows the search 
trends for the phrase “fake news” on Google from January 1, 2016, to 
July 16, 2018. (It shows the frequency of searches, broken down by 
week, as compared to the week when “fake news” was most searched. 
It reports the number of searches as a percentage of that peak.)
18 Schudson and Zelizer, “Fake News in Context,” 2.
19 See, for example, Jody Baumgartner and Jonathan S. Morris, “The Daily Show 
Effect: Candidate Evaluations, Efficacy, and American Youth”; and Jeffrey P. Jones, 




























































































































Figure 28. Google searches for “fake news” from January 2016–July 
2018. Data collected from Google Trends.
Before November 2016, the month of the election, the rate of 
searches was relatively flat. The rate of searches picked up immedi-
ately after the election, peaking right after the inauguration during 
the week of January 8, 2017, with sustained but slowly declining 
interest for the next six months. It peaked again about a year later, 
during the week of January 14, 2018, when Trump made a show of 
awarding the “Fake News Awards.”20
People’s concerns about fake news have changed, especially since 
2016. It became clear during the election that the technological 
environment, especially with social media, had changed dramatic-
ally even in comparison to the 2008 or 2012 elections. Technology 
has lowered the cost of production and allowed a wider range of 
media-producers to enter the market. Consequently, the conditions 
Tuchman described in the 1970s are no longer present. The jour-
nalists she described upheld practices of objectivity in part out of 
20 See Jon Greenberg, Louis Jacobson, and Manuela Tobias, “Fact-Checking Donald 
Trump’s Fake News Awards.”
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a sense of professionalism, but also in part out of fear of losing 
readers to their competitors. When the costs of entry were high, 
markets were limited, and if one organization lost a reader (for 
instance, if its reporters acted unprofessionally), its competitors 
likely gained a reader. Now the logic of competition is different: 
new competitors gain readers by rejecting the norms of the past 
in favour of provocation, thus “undermin[ing] the business models 
of traditional news sources that had enjoyed high levels of public 
trust and credibility.”21
Social media have also played an important role in changing 
how people find and consume news. In 2016, about 40 percent of 
U.S. adults often got news online (through social media and other 
websites), while about 60 percent got it from TV. Younger people 
(between the ages of 18 and 29) were more than twice as likely than 
older people (above age 65) to get their news online (50 percent versus 
20 percent).22 Bots, or automated fake accounts, amplified the effects 
of sharing: “By one recent estimate—that classified accounts based 
on observable features such as sharing behavior, number of ties, and 
linguistic features—between 9 and 15% of active Twitter accounts are 
bots.”23 The effect on the circulation of fake news has been dramatic. 
Research published in Science found, “Falsehood diffused significantly 
farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categor-
ies of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false 
political news than for false news about terrorism, natural disasters, 
science, urban legends, or financial information.”24
What does this brief history tell us about fake news? It helps us 
see that it’s not one thing. The term is polysemic (that is, it has many 
competing meanings—polysemy comes from the Greek πολυ, or poly, 
21 David M. J. Lazer et al., “The Science of Fake News,” 1094.
22 Mitchell et al., Modern News Consumer, 5.
23 Lazer et al., “Science of Fake News,” 1095.




“many” and σῆμα, or sêma, “sign”). Its meaning is contested, and 
some meanings that were once prominent (such as the reference to 
comedy news shows from the early 2000s) have lost their currency. 
In the context of the United States immediately after 2016, the mean-
ings related to misinformation were the most important politically.25
But something has happened in the time since then: 
This phrase has been irredeemably polarized in our current 
political and media climate. As politicians have implemented a 
political strategy of labeling news sources that do not support 
their positions as unreliable or fake news, whereas sources that 
support their positions are labeled reliable or not fake, the term 
has lost all connection to the actual veracity of the information 
presented, rendering it meaningless for use in academic classifi-
cation.26
In other words, fake news has long been a feature of what we would 
now call the media environment. What makes it different now, 
according to Michael Schudson and Barbie Zelizer, is the anxiety it 
has produced about the professionalization of journalism, accompan-
ied by a growing recognition among members of the public, as well 
as scholars and journalists, of the challenges of objectivity. Finally, 
what makes it different is also its propagation by politicians across 
the globe, especially the president of the United States.27
So how do we understand the shift in ideas evoked by the term, 
and, more to the point, the strategies employed by President Trump 
to bring about that shift?
25 Scholars have even broken down fake news into different types, depending on 
the degree to which authors mean to mislead, or the effects they hope to achieve. 
See Hossein Derakhshan and Claire Wardle, “Information Disorder: Definitions.”
26 Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral, “Spread of True and False News Online,” 1146.
27 Schudson and Zelizer, “Fake News in Context,” 3.
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Gaslighting
The same tools we developed in chapter 3 are useful here, in particular 
the idea of frames as elements of logical syllogisms (or fully developed 
signs, in Peirce’s terms), which we used to explain how one person 
could prompt another to see the world from a new perspective. Here 
we will use frames too, but to look at an inverse case. They will help 
us identify one strategy Trump has used to make people doubt news 
sources that, in the past, employed the techniques identified by Tuch-
man and Chalaby to demonstrate their objectivity, or at least their 
neutrality. This doubt has played a key role in bringing about the shift 
in meaning of fake news that has alarmed journalists because of the 
way it has caused some readers’ perspective to become unmoored.
Of course, Trump has used more than just one strategy. For one 
thing, he often simply makes bald assertions that journalists for out-
lets such CNN and the New York Times are peddling lies: “Don’t believe 
the crap you see from these people, the fake news,” he told a conven-
tion of the Veterans of Foreign Affairs in Missouri in July 2018. “What 
you’re seeing and what you’re reading is not what’s happening.”28 His 
supporters have turned “fake news” into a chant they repeat at ral-
lies. But one specific strategy interests us here: his technique, broadly 
speaking, of gaslighting (or denying things his listeners know to be 
true), or, narrowly speaking, of manufacturing situations where jour-
nalists he dislikes appear to contradict themselves.
Commentators across the political spectrum have noted Trump’s 
habit of saying something and then denying it later. During the 2016 
presidential campaign, the website Politifact catalogued “17 times 
Donald Trump said one thing and then denied it,” including a claim 
he made—and then later forgot—about having one of the best mem-
ories in the world.29 A staffer for Ted Cruz, Trump’s principal rival for 
28 Quoted in Katie Rogers and Maggie Haberman, “Spotting CNN on a TV Aboard 
Air Force One, Trump Rages Against Reality.”
29 Linda Qiu, “17 Times Donald Trump Said One Thing and Then Denied It.”
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the Republican nomination in 2016, identified a pattern in Trump’s 
approach. First, he makes a claim that people, especially in the media, 
are unlikely to accept, in order to create a “media frenzy.” Second, he 
asks what other people are saying, as a way to attribute responsibility 
to someone else for saying controversial things. Third, he promises 
to produce evidence that will “get to the truth of the matter.” Fourth, 
he attacks the character of his detractors and opponents. Fifth, and 
finally, he simply declares victory when he’s ready to move on to a 
different topic.30
Rhetorical scholar Jennifer Mercieca gives a name to this 
approach. She identifies it as paralipsis (παράλειψις, from para, 
“beside” and leipein, “to leave”), a “device that enables [Trump] to 
publicly say things that he can later disavow—without ever having 
to take responsibility for his words.”31 It consists in quoting someone 
else, but then denying any responsibility for the claim that person 
is making. It gives Trump plausible deniability when he talks about 
controversial ideas: he can claim the ideas aren’t his and he’s only 
quoting someone else. Twitter is an especially apt platform for this 
approach, given the ease of retweeting someone else’s post: “Trump 
can argue that he can’t be held accountable because he wasn’t the one 
who originally posted the tweet. He can shrug and claim that he’s 
simply giving a voice to an idea.”32 He can benefit from the support 
of white supremacists, for example, by retweeting their posts, but he 
can also claim ignorance of their views when pressed by reporters.
The “Animals” Coming into the Country
This technique, in particular as it involves putting journalists in a 
position where they appear to violate their own professional norms, 
30 Amanda Carpenter, Gaslighting America: Why We Love It When Trump Lies to Us, 15.
31 Jennifer Mercieca, “There’s an Insidious Strategy Behind Donald Trump’s Retweets.”
32 Ibid.
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992930.01
108 The Art of Communication in a Polarized World
is clear in a series of events that followed a controversial statement 
Trump made in May 2018. He was in California to talk about sanctu-
ary cities, whose police officers limit their co-operation with federal 
officers who enforce immigration laws. They do so out of a concern 
to provide services to everyone, even those whose precarious immi-
gration status might dissuade them from approaching the police for 
help. In that context, Fresno County Sheriff Margaret Mims raised 
concerns about the gang MS-13, which originated in Los Angeles in 
the 1980s and grew in strength in Honduras and El Salvador when 
its members were deported. Trump had frequently referred to the 
gang’s excessive violence to justify his hardline stance on immigra-
tion. Mims wanted to talk about the limits she faced because of 
California’s sanctuary laws.
The exchange was controversial because of Trump’s response to 
Mims when she said that she couldn’t contact ICE (the U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement) in certain circumstances, even 
if an MS-13 member were involved:
SHERIFF MIMS: There could be an MS-13 member I know 
about—if they don’t reach a certain threshold, I cannot tell ICE 
about it.
THE PRESIDENT: We have people coming into the country, or 
trying to come in—and we’re stopping a lot of them—but we’re 
taking people out of the country. You wouldn’t believe how bad 
these people are. These aren’t people. These are animals. And 
we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate that’s 
never happened before. And because of the weak laws, they come 
in fast, we get them, we release them, we get them again, we 
bring them out. It’s crazy.33
Journalists, along with other public officials (and especially 
Democratic politicians), objected to the term animals, which they 
33 “Remarks by President Trump at a California Sanctuary State Roundtable.” Also 
quoted in Linda Qiu, “The Context Behind Trump’s ‘Animals’ Comment.”
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thought Trump had applied broadly to immigrants coming into the 
United States. Trump and his defenders countered that animals 
referred narrowly to MS-13 members.
What mattered for both was what Trump meant by “people coming 
into the country.” The two camps used different interpretive frames, 
with corresponding syllogisms, to make sense of his comments. The 
New York Times (on which I will focus here because it has been one of 
Trump’s biggest critics and one of his most frequent targets) inter-
preted the comments within a historical frame, where Trump’s past 
comments about immigrants, especially during the 2016 campaign, 
shaped how people understood his use of the word animals. Trump’s 
administration, in contrast, interpreted his comments within a sec-
urity frame, which was concerned more narrowly with a subset of 
immigrants, namely those who belonged to gangs.
The first article published by the New York Times opened by saying, 
“President Trump lashed out at undocumented immigrants during a 
White House meeting on Wednesday, warning in front of news cam-
eras that dangerous people were clamoring to breach the country’s 
borders and branding such people ‘animals.’” In the next paragraph, 
it made the historical frame clear by explaining, “It was hardly the 
first time the president has spoken in racially fraught terms about 
immigrants.”34 Indeed, Trump declared in the speech announcing his 
candidacy for the presidency that “when Mexico sends its people, 
they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re sending people that have 
lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”35 During his 
campaign, he had promised to strengthen immigration laws and even 
build a wall on the U.S.–Mexico border.
34 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants ‘Animals’ 
in Rant.”
35 Donald Trump, “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech.”
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The chain of interpretants suggested by this article (as well as 
articles that followed the next day) is illustrated in figure 29.36
Figure 29. Donald Trump’s use of the word animals interpreted 
through the frame of recent history.
The initial sign (the word animals), as interpreted through the 
frame of recent history, evokes immigrants in a broad sense. That 
association in turn evokes a more complex sign, a syllogism accord-
ing to which Trump has appealed to nativist tendencies in the past 
by making disparaging remarks about immigrants (major premise), 
and about whom he is making disparaging comments now (minor 
premise). Therefore he must be using the word animals in a broad 
sense, to appeal to the same nativist tendencies as before (conclu-
sion). The idea that he is describing more than just MS-13 (as he 
would claim the next day) is suggested by the broader context of 
the roundtable, which was about sanctuary cities, where the threat 
of gangs was merely an example used to support Mims’s claims. In 
fact, Linda Qiu, responding to Trump’s supporters two days after 
the exchange, explained that Mims’s complaints were true only of 
immigrants—whether gang members or not—who had not commit-
ted violent crimes. As soon as they committed a violent crime, they 
were no longer eligible for protection under sanctuary city laws.37 The 
36 The New York Times brought up the history frame again in an editorial about the 
Trump administration’s policy of separating children from their parents, which it 
viewed as following logically from Trump’s other expressions of animosity toward 
immigrants, going back to the early days of his campaign. See New York Times Edi-
torial Board, “The Cruelty of Breaking Up Immigrant Families.”
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idea that Trump was referring only to violent MS-13 members was 
logically inconsistent: the limits Mims faced, to which Trump was 
responding, did not apply to MS-13.
The Trump administration, on the other hand, interpreted the 
“animal” comments through a different lens, that of security. The day 
after the roundtable, Trump sought to clarify his meaning, placing 
his comments in the context of the immediate exchange with Mims, 
rather than the roundtable itself: “I’m referring, and you know I’m 
referring, to the MS-13 gangs that are coming in. We have laws that 
are laughed at on immigration. So when the MS-13 comes in, when 
the other gang members come into our country, I refer to them as 
animals.”38 The word animals, he contended, referred only to MS-13 
gang members, with the resulting syllogism looking like figure 30:
Figure 30. Donald Trump’s use of the term animals as interpreted 
through the frame of security.
People who committed violent crimes were animals (major prem-
ise), and MS-13 members committed such crimes (minor premise). 
Therefore they—but not immigrants who were not violent—were 
animals (conclusion). On May 18, Trump’s press secretary, Sarah 
Huckabee Sanders, made a similar point by describing violent acts 
committed by MS-13: 
It took an animal to stab a man a hundred times and decapitate 
him and rip his heart out. It took an animal to beat a woman—
they were sex trafficking—with a bat 28 times, indenting part 
38 Quoted in Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Niraj Chokshi, “Trump Defends ‘Animals’ 










112 The Art of Communication in a Polarized World
of her body. And it took an animal to kidnap, drug and rape a 
14-year-old Houston girl.39
The point here is not to determine who was right or wrong. Parti-
sans at all points along the political spectrum were subject to the 
paradox we identified at the beginning of chapter 3: their world-
view influenced what they saw as salient, and what they saw as 
salient influenced their worldview. That is, their symbolic world 
remained relatively closed. They understood events in such a way 
that certain aspects of context appeared salient, influencing, for 
instance, whether they took a broad or narrow view of the exchange 
between Mims and Trump, or whether they interpreted Trump’s 
use of the word animals through the frame of history or security. 
The context they picked out then shaped how they understood 
what Trump meant. Each interpretive choice worked in this loop 
to confirm their pre-existing symbolic logic. For instance, those 
who interpreted Trump’s comments through a security frame 
gave more weight to his mentions of violence, which led them to 
see MS-13 members as “animals” and reinforced the idea that the 
salient features of recent events involving U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement were the acts of violence (figure 31). Those 
who interpreted Trump’s comments through a history frame, on 
the other hand, gave more weight to his history of nativist state-
ments, which led them to see similar ideas now and reinforced the 
idea that the salient features of recent events related to his nativist 
appeals (figure 32). For this reason, any judgement we might make 
about who was right would fall along partisan lines because we, 
too, attribute more importance to certain aspects of context than 
others, an inescapably partisan choice.
39 Quoted in Qiu, “Context Behind Trump’s ‘Animals’ Comment.”
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Figure 31. A feedback loop showing how people who focus on the 
violence mentioned by Trump also focus on violence in recent events.
Figure 32. A feedback loop showing how people who focus on Trump’s 
history of nativist comments also focus on his current expressions of 
nativist sentiments.
What matters instead is the strategy Trump used to implicate 
journalists in producing what he could point to as fake news. On 
May 18, he posted a tweet that made it look as though the New York 
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Fake News Media had me calling Immigrants, or Illegal Immi-
grants, “Animals.” Wrong! They were begrudgingly forced to 
withdraw their stories. I referred to MS 13 Gang Members as 
“Animals,” a big difference—and so true. Fake News got it pur-
posely wrong, as usual!40
He was shifting blame and putting journalists on the defensive in 
such a way that the label fake news seemed all the more applicable.
At least one columnist at the New York Times agreed. Bret Ste-
phens, a conservative columnist and frequent critic of Donald 
Trump, thought the coverage by his newspaper and others played 
into Trump’s hands by supporting the story he wanted to tell about 
journalists. He pointed out retractions or clarifications made by the 
Associated Press and by Democratic politicians once the security 
frame became dominant (he did not acknowledge the plausibility of 
the history frame). “The president’s apologists,” he said, “can now 
point to a genuine instance of fake news—not merely factually mis-
taken, but wilfully misleading—in order to dismiss the great bulk of 
negative reporting that isn’t fake.”41
Stephens’s column highlighted the impact of doubt on perspec-
tive. For Trump’s supporters, the strategy of implicating journalists 
had the effect of casting them in a partisan light, undermining any 
claims they might make to neutrality and supporting (or appearing 
to support) Trump’s claims that the news they produced was false. In 
this way, it strengthened associations with the security frame (figure 
31) and weakened associations with the history frame (figure 32). 
Doubt became a tool for shifting the meaning of fake news so it was 
no longer a word used by journalists to describe made-up stories (as 
it was briefly after the 2016 election) but instead was a word used by 
people in positions of political power to describe stories they found 
troublesome.
40 From the Twitter account of @realDonaldTrump, May 18, 2018, https://twitter.
com/realdonaldtrump/status/997429518867591170.




Although we can’t generalize from this one example, we can find 
others like it. In June 2018, for instance, journalist Liz Plank observed 
something similar in the controversy provoked by First Lady Mel-
ania Trump when she wore a jacket with the message “I REALLY 
DON’T CARE, DO U?” as she boarded a plane to visit an immigrant 
detention centre in Texas. Journalists criticized the message while 
spokespeople for the First Lady objected that it was only a jacket—
something trivial and not worth the attention. Plank saw the jacket 
as bait that other journalists took, arguing that the decision to wear it 
creates a circus where . . . networks like Fox News can roll the 
clips and tweets from reporters being critical of [the First Lady’s] 
choice of clothing to confirm to their viewers that the media 
cannot be trusted and that they don’t focus on what the Amer-
ican people really care about.42
In other words, journalists acted out a script written by members of 
the Trump administration, which strengthened the idea that major 
news organizations were purveyors of fake news.
The proliferation of the term fake news has a broad range of impli-
cations, especially for the functioning of democracy in the United 
States and abroad, that others have addressed more effectively than 
I can here.43 This analysis of the strategies Trump has used to shift 
the sense of the term does lead us to one useful conclusion, how-
ever. Carried to its logical extreme, the unmooring of perspective 
brought about by this shift encourages the growth of conspiracy 
theories grounded in a solipsism that follows a logic we saw in Nine-
teen Eighty-Four. People who believe these theories can explain away 
42 Amira Rasool, “Journalist Liz Plank Believes the Media Was Baited by Melania 
Trump’s Zara Jacket.”
43 See, for instance, New York Times Editorial Board, “A Free Press Needs You” and 
“The True Damage of Trump’s ‘Fake News’”; and Michelle Goldberg, “The Autocrats’ 
Playbook.”
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any evidence that would disprove them by arguing that it is really 
just manufactured by members of the conspiracy. Evidence produced 
by “fake news” outlets is no evidence at all because the source is not 
trustworthy.
The danger posed by this shift has increased as Trump and others 
have replaced the phrase fake news with the phrase enemy of the 
people. Trump himself has observed this change, as he wrote in a 
tweet in July 2018:
Had a very good and interesting meeting at the White House 
with A. G. Sulzberger, Publisher of the New York Times. Spent 
much time talking about the vast amounts of Fake News being 
put out by the media & how that Fake News has morphed into 
phrase, “Enemy of the People.” Sad!44
Journalists worry that such rhetoric will lead to violence against 
them.45
Where does this analysis of the phrase fake news—along with 
that of Petr Pavlenskii and Nineteen Eighty-Four and “Encoding/
Decoding”—leave us? We’ve explored the utopian and dystopian 
dimensions of cultural translation as a mode of substituting signs 
and changing people’s perspectives. What are the implications for us 
as students and teachers living in the twenty-first century?
44 From the Twitter account of @realDonaldTrump, July 29, 2018, https://twitter.
com/realDonaldTrump/status/1023546197129224192.
45 See, for example, Bret Stephens, “Trump Will Have Blood on His Hands”; and 






If you read enough scholarly books, you discover there’s a formula 
for the concluding chapter. First, you summarize all the preceding 
chapters, making the links clear from one to the next. Second, you 
anticipate your critics’ responses. What will they disagree with, and 
what will be the substance of their critique? (You then respond to 
them pre-emptively.) Third, you explain why any of this matters. You 
answer the eternal question: So what? Who cares?
I’m going to break from this formula, although I will address 
those concerns soon enough. Instead, I want to come back to a key 
idea in structuring this book, what in the introduction I called an 
epistemology of jumping in.1 It brings together cultural translation, 
communication theory, and what they help us do.
To do that, I want to start with two stories.
Story one. When I was in late elementary school, I bought 
a television for my bedroom. I asked my parents if I could, and 
they—underestimating my resolve and willingness to delay grati-
fication—said I could if I saved my own money. So for two years, 
I saved my allowance, rarely spending any of it, until I had $80. I 
bought a five-and-a-half inch black-and-white TV that got four fuzzy 
channels. I loved that thing, far more (I’m sure) than my parents 
would have liked.
1 Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with how we 
know what we know.
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One day the on-off switch began to falter. It would turn on, but 
you’d have to hold it just right, or it’d flicker off again. At first I could 
live with it, but it got worse and worse. Soon I couldn’t watch it at all. 
My dad said we could fix it. I asked him how, and he said he didn’t 
know—we’d open it up and figure out it. I was pretty nervous—I 
saved up for two years to buy that thing, and he didn’t even know 
how we’d fix it? He reassured me: once the case was open, we’d have 
the tools we needed to diagnose the problem and fix it.
What choice did I have?
So that’s what we did. It turns out that for a split second, each 
time you turned it on the switch was carrying too much current. We 
put in a switch that could handle more current, and the TV worked 
for another fifteen years.
Story two. During the first week of my first year as an undergradu-
ate at the University of North Dakota, I walked into the International 
Centre, where the study abroad programs were housed, and I knocked 
on the director’s door. “Hi,” I said, reaching out my hand. “I’m Kyle, 
and I want to study in France.” (I get straight to the point when I’ve 
made up my mind.) “Okay,” the director said. “Here are some pro-
grams. Where would you like to go?” I signed up to go to St. Étienne, 
a town about an hour from Lyon in southeastern France. 
So it was that a year later, at age nineteen, I boarded an airplane 
bound for Paris, where I’d take a train to Caen for a three-week inten-
sive language course, before finally heading to St. Étienne. I got to 
France and immediately made an alarming discovery (figure 33): my 
French classes in high school and university had not prepared me in 
any meaningful way to talk with French people. As eager a learner as 
I was, I wasn’t prepared for how fast people talked, or for the fact that 
no one talked like they were in a textbook. (I mean, why would they?) 
Still, I had to eat, and for that, I had to talk. I also had to buy train 
tickets and ride buses and move into my room in the residence hall. 
I didn’t have the tools I thought I had, but I clearly couldn’t choose 
to do nothing. Hunger is a great motivator—I had to talk, even if I 
didn’t know the words.
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Figure 33. Me, arriving in St. Étienne, France, overconfident and about 
to discover just how little I know. Adapted from photograph by Nicolas 
Peyrard (2007, “Tramway de St. Étienne”), CC-BY 3.0. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons.
These two stories have something important in common: they’re 
about acting even when I lacked the confidence to act. They’re also 
about learning confidence through that process. In short, they’re 
about the epistemology of jumping in—a way of coming to know the 
world by engaging in it and making mistakes.
What I mean is this. We base every decision on partial or incom-
plete information, not just the ones where the limits of what we know 
are clear, as in my two anecdotes. Still, even though we can’t know 
everything about a situation, we’re often faced with a choice. We can’t 
choose to do nothing. (Even a choice not to act is a choice.) We learn 
to swim by jumping in, so to speak. In the process, we discover two 
things. First, we get a clearer sense of what we don’t know. We find 
the gaps in our knowledge, the voids we need to fill. Second, we find 
that by acting, we begin to fill in those gaps.
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Of course, jumping in always comes with a risk—we might be 
wrong, we might misread a situation, we might misjudge what we 
need to do. This is a common experience when we study abroad in a 
language that’s not our own: we miss the unspoken cues that signal 
complicity or irony or humour. Everyone’s laughing, and we don’t 
know why. Here, too, we run a risk in not acting—we can be wrong in 
inaction just as much as in action. When we encounter a void, it can 
be difficult even to gauge which option is riskier. Do we laugh along, 
and risk perhaps hurting someone’s feelings, or do we stay quiet, and 
make people feel awkward? Or do we smile feebly and hope someone 
will explain what’s going on?
That’s where this book is useful (or so I hope). Cultural translation 
and communication theory both provide tools for understanding how 
and where we jump in. Cultural translation—the idea that meaning is 
only relatively stable and that we can develop strategies for seeing the 
world differently (and persuading others to do the same)—is a gen-
eral phenomenon, an everyday experience. Doing theory is a specific 
application: it consists in understanding how we use those strategies 
and in refining our understanding of them through observation and 
induction. Both are about making decisions based on incomplete 
information.
We’ll spend the rest of this chapter exploring that link. We’ll 
consider how an ungenerous critic might read my argument about 
cultural translation (but make no mistake—this critique is a consti-
tutive component of my argument because without it my argument 
would be limp). We’ll consider the role of communication theory as 
an application of cultural translation, and finally, we’ll talk about 
why this matters. In short, it matters because, as an idea, cultural 
translation calls on us to examine our relations to others through 




Cultural Translation and the Epistemology of Jumping In
When scholars read, we do so with a well-honed skepticism. Our 
reflex is to doubt each claim, always making the same demand: con-
vince me.
So as I write, I take on the role of a skeptical reader. And if I were 
reading this book, I’d find three main points of contention. First, 
my biggest critique would be that it lacks generalizable claims. It 
works from an odd collection of texts—I mean, really, who brings 
Claude Shannon, Warren Weaver, Stuart Hall, George Orwell, cli-
mate skeptics, Pussy Riot, Petr Pavlenskii, Aristotle, and Donald 
Trump together in the same book?—but with no statistics to tell 
us how we might apply the claims to other populations. How do 
we know any of this has changed anyone’s mind, or is likely to in 
the future?
This observation is true, but it misses the point. I’d reply—in 
the academic jargon I likely share with such a reader—that this 
book is performative. Its structure is like that of chapter 1: it jumps 
into examples to encourage inductive reasoning. Consequently, my 
description in this concluding chapter is a metatheoretical account 
of that performative dimension (that is, it’s theory about theory, 
and it describes how this book works to talk about what it says).
More simply, I’d say that the arguments I make are not gener-
alizable in the way that social scientists might want. They do not 
involve random samples, and they have no statistical significance. 
In fact, they aren’t falsifiable, meaning they do not have the cap-
acity to be proven right or wrong. Instead, they rely on persuasion. 
They describe a logic they arrive at inductively, and they invite a 
response—they ask you to argue, refute, and improve. Moreover, I 
ask you to argue, refute, and improve. I ask you. (That’s why I wel-
come a skeptical reading. I’d like to have a beer with my critic so we 
have time to talk. My reader brings a different set of tools that will 
help me refine these ideas. We’ll refine them together.)
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My second critique would also relate to the book’s eclectic 
approach. It seems to lack order. It’s spaghetti thrown against a wall 
to see what sticks.
To this I’d reply that jumping in is a way to act with necessar-
ily incomplete knowledge. It’s an epistemology of contingency and 
action, and it requires that we think on our toes. The eclectic selec-
tion of texts reflects that idea. Sometimes we need to improvise a 
tool when we discover a need. We need to dig, and for that, we look 
for a shovel. If we don’t have one, we look at the tools we do have, 
we turn them around to get another view, and eventually we find 
one that will dig a hole (figure 34). Or we’re in a foreign country, and 
we don’t speak the language very well. There’s an idea for which we 
don’t know the word, but we don’t have a dictionary at hand, so we 
improvise: we mime, we draw on a napkin, we use the words we do 
know to describe the one we don’t. Our theoretical tools work the 
same way, as the parallax approach has shown. We pick them up, turn 
them around, and figure out which will do the trick. So eclectic, yes, 
but strategically so.
Figure 34. My workbench. It’s a mess. Can you find a tool to dig with? 
Photograph by the author.
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Finally, my third critique would be that the claims I’ve made about 
what we can know and how we can know it aren’t applicable outside 
of the examples I give. In this case, I’d tend to agree. I’m making 
claims that apply to my classroom and my students, whom I ask 
to think about what we—together in the same space, at a regular 
time each week, subject as all people are to weather and traffic and 
jobs and grades—know and don’t know. Naming what we know is 
straightforward enough: we know what it feels like to bump into 
the stubborn facts of the world.2 Naming what we don’t know is also 
straightforward: we don’t know the stubborn facts of the world out-
side the mediation of our senses. Of course, a lot hinges on the key 
terms in those statements: facts, world, senses, words we come to 
understand in increasingly complex ways as we ask new questions 
to revise our old answers. Remember the three axioms I introduced 
in the introduction:
1. Theory is an attempt to explain our experience of the world.
2. If the explanation theory offers doesn’t match our experience, 
it’s bad theory. 
(2a. In the end, it’s all bad theory.)
3. We must refine our explanation to replace bad theory with 
better theory.3
Even if we are concerned only with what we know in the classroom, 
this approach to theory has a built-in mechanism for refinement, 
and it will eventually pull us out into the wider world. It forces us to 
immerse ourselves in experience—in a word, to jump in.4
2 Or, if not the world, what we must pragmatically approach as “the world” if we 
want to avoid falling into the nihilistic solipsism of bad poststructuralism or para-
noid internet echo chambers railing against all things “fake.”
3 Note how these axioms evoke something different—a richer set of ideas, I hope—
to you now than they did when you read them in the introduction.
4 Sam Rocha calls this approach “folk phenomenology,” or the effort to relate our 
experience of the world, but without the specialized vocabulary we might develop if 
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Communication Theory and the Act of Jumping In
This built-in mechanism for refinement brings us back to an idea 
I introduced in the opening pages of the book, that of theory as 
technē, or a craft we learn by practicing, like music or art. It’s a set of 
skills, a way of training ourselves to be aware of our perception and 
experience of the world—and, more to the point, of communication. 
The best way to develop these skills is by using them—to jump into 
theory, that foreign language (as I also wrote in the opening pages), 
and learn them as we go.
To put that idea into practice, I structured the book to follow the 
three axioms. After the introduction, chapter 1 offered an explana-
tion of one aspect of communication. To use a sign, it argued, is to 
transform and translate it. Words accumulate meaning as people 
respond to each other and take their respective responses into 
account. Even from one use to the next, a word doesn’t evoke exactly 
the same thing—a gap opens up, even if it’s slight. That idea led me to 
assert that this process of transformation and translation “opens up 
a space for a politics of invention,” as I wrote, “where we can rethink 
our relation to cultural others so that people we once feared can find 
their place in the communities we claim as our own.”
That was axiom 1 (theory as explanation). Chapters 2 to 4 tested 
that explanation. Of course, I mean “tested” in a different way than 
a social scientist. “Testing” in the humanities-oriented sense, as I use 
it here, means using stories or art we find compelling to help think 
through the implications of an argument. Thus chapter 2 reveals ways 
this translation can help us know the world in new ways, but also how 
it can loosen our grip on what we think we know. Chapter 3 helps 
us develop tools to persuade each other and ground our experience, 
while chapter 4 shows how those tools, too, can cut both ways.
studied phenomenology in a formal sense. See Rocha, Folk Phenomenology: Educa-
tion, Study, and the Human Person.
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That was axiom 2 (theory’s potential fallibility) and its corollary, 
2a (its certain fallibility). Chapter 1 argued that cultural translation 
can make society more inclusive, but it overlooked the ways it can 
also lead to oppression and exclusion. Part of the explanation did not 
match our experience of the world, where oppression remains a very 
real phenomenon, so we had to revise it. Hence chapter 2, whose pur-
pose was to improve the initial explanation by identifying its limits. 
Chapters 3 and 4 followed the same pattern. Chapter 3 proposed tools 
for changing people’s minds, based on the explanation developed in 
the chapters before it. But it, too, fell short, failing to account for the 
negative potential of those tools. Hence chapter 4, whose purpose—
again—was to improve the explanation by identifying its limits.
Where does that leave us? We arrive at axiom 3, concerned with 
theory’s refinement. The preceding chapters were the back-and-forth 
exchange (between me and my students and my imagined readers) 
that helped us arrive at a clearer understanding of cultural trans-
lation and communication: we’ve replaced faulty explanations 
with better explanations. That effort is the impetus for the idea of 
jumping in, which this conclusion has developed. It’s an approach 
that forces us to recognize that we can’t anticipate everything we’ll 
encounter. We’ll have to improvise, based on the situations we 
encounter. That recognition is the key refinement to the theories 
proposed in chapters 1 to 4, a way to extend or even surpass the 
tool of the parallax view.
But here’s where things get trippy. My three axioms also apply to 
metatheory, or explanations about what theory is. They, too, can be 
tested and found lacking. What happens if we take a step back and 
treat my axioms themselves as an explanation of our experience of 
the world? In other words (there’s that phrase again!), what hap-
pens if we rewrite the axioms by substituting specific observations 




1. We operate in the world by explaining it, testing our explana-
tions, and refining them as necessary.
2. If we do not operate this way, our metatheory falls short. 
(2a. In the end, all metatheory falls short.)
3. We must refine our explanation by accounting for those 
things our initial formulation left out.
Where does that formulation fall short? In the analysis in chapters 
1 to 4, my focus was on developing concepts, and the explanations 
I put forward and critiqued served that purpose. I wanted to show 
how cultural translation has more than one valence: it can include 
or exclude, provide perspective or remove it. But we are more than 
merely cerebral creatures, and we deal with more than just concepts. 
The assertion that we can generalize my approach to talk about how 
we come to know the broader world simplifies our interactions with 
other people (who, of course, are part of that broader world). It misses 
a key aspect of our lives, namely the value we assign to our actions.
How do we refine this assertion? How do we account for the 
dimensions of experience that it overlooks? The answer lies in an 
idea that has been present throughout the book but has remained, 
until now, more or less latent. It is the idea of ethics.
Conclusion: Cultural Translation and the Call to Ethics
Communication scholar John Durham Peters reminds us of some-
thing fundamental and important to remember here: communication 
always involves two people.5 As a result, “communication theory 
becomes consubstantial with ethics, political philosophy, and social 
theory in its concern for relations between self and other, self and 
self, and closeness and distance in social organizations.”6 Whenever 
5 Even when I talk to myself, I imagine myself as if I were someone else, as if I 
stepped out of my body and am talking to someone else.
6 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication, 10.
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there are two people in relation to each other, they have to figure 
out how to act, and one dimension of that process is that of ethics.
The same is true of cultural translation. In its positive valence—
when we use it to make society more inclusive—it implies an ethical 
stance and an openness toward others. If we were not open to others, 
we wouldn’t engage with them, instead trying simply to impose our 
will. (Of course, some people do take that approach. They’re not open 
to others, and they refuse to engage with them.) Cultural translation 
requires us to strike a balance between finding things in common 
and respecting difference. It can bring others closer but in a way 
that they maintain their sense of self. We have to be careful not to 
say “Oh, you’re just like me!” if doing so causes us to miss import-
ant ways people are different. Such an attitude might make us feel 
like we’re being inclusive, but if it denies people an essential part of 
themselves, then that feeling is tragically misleading. We can’t know 
others in any definitive way, any more than we can know the world 
in a definitive way. Instead, we jump into a relation with them and 
fill in the gaps as we go.
This task is not easy, especially when we are mindful of an obser-
vation I made in the introductory chapter: people—even those on 
opposite sides of a conflict—tend to see themselves as the good 
guys. We all think we’re the scrappy rebels from Star Wars, and our 
adversaries belong to the villainous Empire. So what is the difference 
between groups who use cultural translation to encourage inclusion 
and those who use it to oppress? It is their humility, in the form of 
openness to the possibility they might be wrong. The Party in Nine-
teen Eighty-Four, for instance, makes the a priori assumption that it 
is right, and it uses force to impose its will. I suspect that the people 
who use the phrase “fake news” to enclose others in a solipsistic, 
perspectiveless world do something similar. On the other hand, the 
judge in Brecht’s poem (about the immigrant who answers “1492” 
to every question the judge asks) is open to the idea that he might 
be wrong, or the that system he represents might be wrong. His 
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invention is not reliant on force. Similarly, Petr Pavlenskii does not 
rely on force. Instead, he invites people to see the world as he does, 
relying on the strategy of showing them how they are implicated in 
the system he wants to change.
How do we avoid imposing our will? Over the course of this book, I 
have described three dimensions of cultural translation, the first two 
of which are power and meaning. They influence each other: power 
shapes the way people talk about things, and thus the meaning they 
attribute to them (or the meaning those things evoke). Power can 
derive from social structure or from force, and its roots are in the 
history of interactions and resulting relations between people, in 
small groups and large. At the same time, meaning influences power. 
Its roots are related, as they, too, are in the history of interactions 
between people. 
The third dimension is that of creation or invention, which can 
be playful or serious or both, a way—at least potentially—to turn 
meaning against power. Everything hinges on this third dimension. 
Everything hinges on invention. If cultural translation has anything 
to teach us about communication, it is this: we can open up space for 
others when we recognize that we ourselves might be wrong. In doing 
so, we address one of the critiques raised in the introductory chapter: 
we have taken the necessary first step for finding common ground for 
negotiating the meaning we make of the world. This recognition leads 
to a specific strategy for invention, one that can be summed up quite 
simply: listen first, speak second. Ask first, tell second. In this way, we 
arrive at an unexpected answer to the question that opens this book. 
How do we change people’s minds? By opening ourselves to the 





There are at least three approaches to teaching communication 
theory. Perhaps the most common is to organize a course around dif-
ferent subfields or traditions. Robert Craig and Heidi Muller provide 
the best model of this approach in Theorizing Communication, a book 
I have often used, but with certain reservations. The subfield-based 
approach is paradoxical: what starts out as a descriptive model of 
theory ends up becoming a prescriptive model for theory, to borrow 
a distinction from James Carey.1 Less abstractly, Craig and Muller 
begin by describing communication theory as its practitioners have 
developed it. They argue that the subfields they identify are those 
that theorists themselves have created. But by dividing communi-
cation into subfields, they simultaneously create a set of templates 
for how to do theoretical inquiry, which professors reproduce when 
they organize a class along subfield lines. Professors run the risk of 
taking their object of study—theory—for granted, when instead 
they should be asking students to approach it critically. For that 
reason I tell my students, if you’re going to take a subfield-oriented 
approach, their book is the best you’ll find, but you need to examine 
their premise with a healthy skepticism.
A second approach is historical, exemplified by John Durham 
Peters’s Speaking into the Air or Armand Mattelart’s L’invention de 
1 James Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” 25.
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la communication. It consists in reading what people have had to 
say about communication, starting perhaps with Plato’s Gorgias or 
Phaedrus, followed by Aristotle’s Rhetoric, then working through 
the present day. The problem with this approach, however, is that it 
requires a familiarity with communication theory from the outset, 
something third-year undergraduates enrolled in a survey course 
typically don’t have. I have taken this approach at the graduate level, 
however.
Finally, the third approach is the one I adopt here. It consists in 
asking what we mean by the word theory and the competing ideas it 
evokes. My goal is to equip students to read the types of arguments 
they would encounter in a class that adopted either of the other two 
approaches. I want them to see that theorists respond to and argue 
with each other about the nature of the phenomena they set them-
selves the task of describing.
I structure the course as a reconstructed conversation about 
a series of questions, some abstract, some more concrete, that 
communication theorists have asked. Each chapter of The Art of 
Communication in a Polarized World makes use of ideas others have 
developed, and I give students essays by those people first. In that 
way, the book chapter is a turn taken in this conversation, and the 
questions I ask prompt students to take their turn, too.
Engaging Students in the Conversation About Theory
I have adopted two strategies for engaging students in the conversa-
tion about theory. First, at the end of each lesson, I ask open-ended 
questions to provoke discussion. The questions change depending 
on the students’ interests and proclivity for talking, but they usually 
focus attention on a concrete object.2 Their purpose is twofold. For 
2 To discuss solipsism, for instance, the Black Mirror episode “San Junipero” has 
prompted rather heated discussions about the nature of reality and our ability to 
know it through our senses.
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one thing, they ground students’ reading in the here-and-now, not 
in some abstract world where academic ideas often seem to live. For 
another, they bridge the gap between chapters by priming students 
to think about the themes in the chapter that follows. In this way, 
if I’m successful, the questions draw students into the conversation 
I’ve manufactured and give them a way of jumping into the practice 
of theory.
The second strategy has been to incorporate creative works, such as 
novels, television, and poetry. These works serve three purposes. First, 
they demonstrate different ways to ask questions about communi-
cation (and translation). I want to claim a place for the humanities 
in conversations about communication theory, which has its roots 
in philosophy, as the references to Plato and Aristotle make clear. I 
emphasize communication’s long history in humanistic thought, not 
to the exclusion of the social sciences, but instead as their conceptual 
foundation.3 Second, creative works invite students to explore the 
world from other perspectives. As Kwame Anthony Appiah writes, 
“Conversations across boundaries of identity—whether national, 
religious, or something else—begin with the sort of imaginative 
engagement you get when you read a novel or watch a movie or attend 
to a work of art that speaks from some place other than your own.”4 
Finally, they’re fun. They engage students. A cynic might accuse me 
of pandering, but I’m not. We need to take students seriously. Con-
sequently, we need to recognize the importance of speaking to them 
about things that matter to them. Not every creative work will appeal 
to every student, to be sure, but I try to incorporate a wide enough 
variety that students will find something that speaks to them. Theory, 
I insist, is meaningful only if it explains things that matter.
3 Although social scientists might not recognize the humanistic roots of their work, 
without the humanities, it could not exist. Methods textbooks, for instance, are 
built on a foundation of epistemology and rhetoric, manifest (among other places) 
in their discussions of what claims can be made and supported or how they might be 
most persuasively presented.




I am including below the essentials of the syllabus I have followed 
when using The Art of Communication in a Polarized World to teach my 
third-year undergraduate course. The syllabus evolves each semester 
and will no doubt change the next time I teach the course.
AdvAnced Theories in communicATion
Rationale and Objectives
Communication theory is nothing more than an attempt to 
explain what communication is. Sometimes we ask broadly about 
exchange, transmission, and ritual. Sometimes we ask narrowly 
about how what we share in specific situations affects the people 
we share it with. But in all cases, that explanation is our goal.
In this course, we will explore communication theory by 
reading answers people have given to a series of questions that 
start broadly: What is theory? What is communication? How does 
speech shape thought? Then the questions narrow down: How 
do we change people’s minds? How can we be confident in what 
we read? The readings recreate a conversation of sorts, as people 
respond to each other and develop their ideas. This conversa-
tion leads to our final question, namely, What does it mean to do 
theory? How do we participate in this conversation?
By the end of the course, you should be able to:
• identify and explain conflicting ways people have answered 
questions about communication;
• find and use evidence to answer questions about 
communication; and





The Art of Communication in a Polarized World
Individual articles as listed in the reading schedule5
Reading Schedule
Week 1 Introduction: What are we doing here? 
Readings: Art of Communication, Preface; Korb, “The 
Soul-Crushing Student Essay”
Week 2 What is theory? (part 1) 
Readings: Craig, “Communication Theory as a Field”; 
Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication”
Week 3 What is theory? (part 2) 
Reading: Art of Communication, Introduction
Week 4 What is communication? (part 1) 
Readings: Weaver, “The Mathematics of Communica-
tion”; Hall, “Encoding/Decoding”
Week 5 What is communication? (part 2) 
Readings: Merrell, “Charles Sanders Peirce’s Concept of 
the Sign”; Art of Communication, Chapter 1
Week 6 How does speech shape thought? (part 1) 
Readings: Sapir, “The Status of Linguistics as a Science”; 
Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres” (excerpt)
Week 7 How does speech shape thought? (part 2) 
Readings: Nastasia and Rakow, “What Is Theory?”; Art of 
Communication, Chapter 2
Week 8 How do we change people’s minds? (part 1) 
Readings: Aristotle, Rhetoric (excerpt); Aristotle, The Art 
of Poetry (excerpt)
5 Full citations for the readings are in the bibliography.
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Week 9 How do we change people’s minds? (part 2) 
Reading: Art of Communication, Chapter 3
Week 10 How can we be confident in what we read? (part 1) 
Readings: Tuchman, “Objectivity as a Strategic Ritual”; 
Gauthier, “In Defence of a Supposedly Outdated Notion”
Week 11 How can we be confident in what we read? (part 2) 
Reading: Art of Communication, Chapter 4
Week 12 Conclusion: How do we do theory? 
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